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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The latter half of the 1970s is most frequently portrayed in the literature as the 
moment when British decline reached its nadir, marked by further retreat from 
existing commitments under the pressure of intractable domestic political and 
economic difficulties. Britain’s defining characteristic in this period was a profound 
lack of confidence as a major power, dependent on its nuclear deterrent for residual 
status and influence.1 
 
Great Britain was not the same in 1978 as it had been before 1945. Britain was now merely a 
great power in a superpower system and had transformed from empire to nation-state; it could 
no longer stand alone in ‘splendid isolation’ and had joined the European Economic 
Community (EEC); and its economy was deteriorating. Historical narratives about Britain in 
the late 1970s tend to focus on the domestic economic and social problems plaguing the 
government, culminating in the infamous ‘Winter of Discontent’2 in 1978-9 that led to the fall 
of Prime Minister James Callaghan’s Labour government (1976-9) and 18 consecutive years of 
Conservative Party rule in Britain. 
 While the Winter of Discontent demanded the government’s full attention and Britain 
supposedly suffered ‘a profound lack of confidence as a major power’,3 the Uganda-Tanzania 
War (1978-9) broke out. Unlike other major African conflicts at the time, the Uganda-Tanzania 
War was a purely inter-African war without direct origins in the Cold War.4 It began on 30 
October 1978, when Uganda invaded Tanzania and annexed part of its territory, and ended on 
                                                 
1 Ann Lane, «Foreign and Defence Policy», in Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson (eds.), New Labour, Old 
Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79. London 2004: 154. 
2 The winter of 1978-9 is often referred to in Britain as the ‘Winter of Discontent’. The Winter of Discontent 
started when the trade unions refused to accept the Labour government’s suggestions for continued incomes 
policy and a 5% limit on pay rises in order to combat inflation. The winter of 1978-79 was extraordinarily 
cold and saw a series of trade union strikes by crucial professionals such as nurses, refuse collectors and, 
famously, the Liverpool grave diggers. The strikes were largely over by February 1979, but the resulting 
dissatisfaction contributed significantly towards the Labour Party’s loss in the May 1979 general election. 
For more information about the Winter of Discontent, see chapter 2.1. 
3 Lane 2004: 154. 
4 The Cold War was a conflict in which the United States and the Soviet Union vied for geopolitical and 
economic world dominance between 1947 and 1989. The Cold War was also an ideological conflict about the 
organisation of society, in which the Soviet Union and its allies sought the spread of statist communism while 
the United States and its allies promoted liberalism and capitalism. Thanks to nuclear deterrence direct 
military conflict between the superpowers never erupted, although indirect confrontation did occur in the 
form of proxy wars. For more information about the Cold War, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding 
International Conflicts: An introduction to theory and history. New York 2009: 116ff. 
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11 April 1979, when a Tanzanian counter-invasion overthrew the Ugandan regime of President 
Idi Amin and peace was restored. 
 The objective of this thesis is the study of Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War. 
The conflict was of potential interest to Britain for several reasons: East Africa5 was considered 
geo-strategically important in the Cold War, and Britain feared Communist dominance6 in the 
region; the war broke out between two of Britain’s former colonies in which it still retained 
considerable interests and wanted to increase its influence; Britain had broken diplomatic 
relations with Uganda and wanted its regime overthrown; and the conflict erupted close to 
Southern Africa, where Britain’s African interests and vulnerability were strongest. Still, as the 
Uganda-Tanzania War did not threaten British territory and was not essentially a Cold War 
conflict, Britain could have chosen to ignore it. It did not, and the study of Britain’s policy on 
the Uganda-Tanzania War will show us just how far Britain was willing to go to protect or 
further its interests in remote parts of the globe in 1978-9, thus allowing us to discuss whether 
the literature is correct in assuming that Britain lacked the ability and confidence to pursue its 
global political interests. 
 
1.1 Historiography 
Academic interest in Britain’s foreign policy and international status in the latter half of the 20th 
century has been intense, and an extensive body of historical work exists on the subject.7 The 
most influential narrative expressed in these works has been a story of decline in which Britain, 
a former great power, struggled to retain some of its former global power8 while facing a 
                                                 
5 The term ‘East Africa’, as defined by the United Nations, constitutes 20 countries located on the eastern side of 
Africa. For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘Central East Africa’ will be used to describe the smaller 
region consisting of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Although they are part of Central East 
Africa and populous for their minuscule size, Rwanda and Burundi were not involved in the Uganda-
Tanzania War and are therefore of minor importance for this thesis as opposed to Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. 
6 Britain feared that it would lose influence and access to African markets if the communist countries were able 
to win Africa’s ‘hearts and minds’. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘communism’ as ‘A theory or 
system of social organization in which all property is owned by the community and each person contributes 
and receives according to their ability and needs.’ Source: Oxforddictionaries.com, Communism (accessed 
25 March 2015). Britain feared that it would lose influence and access to African markets if the communist 
countries were able to win Africa’s ‘hearts and minds’. 
7 See David Childs, Britain since 1945: A political history. London 2006; David Sanders, Losing an Empire, 
Finding a Role. British Foreign policy since 1945. London 1990; Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power: 
British Foreign Policy since 1945. London 1995; Norman Lowe, Mastering modern British history. 
Basingstoke 2009; Brian Harrison, Finding a role? The United Kingdom 1970-1990. Oxford 2010. 
8 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘power’ as ‘The capacity or ability to direct or influence the behaviour 
of others or the course of events’. Source: Oxforddictionaries.com, Imperialism (accessed 20 March 2015). 
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changing international order, relative economic decline and the loss of its empire. Writes James 
Mayall: 
 
British pre-eminence, never in any case as secure as it can be made to look in the after-
glow of nostalgia, has long departed the international scene, and with it has gone the self-
confidence and the framework of foreign policy.9 
 
Many historians have taken issue with this pessimistic narrative, and taken it upon themselves 
to present a more nuanced view of British history since 1945. They demonstrate that Britain’s 
influence was not lost, but transformed; as its traditional projection of military power was 
becoming too expensive and also increasingly perceived as morally unacceptable, Britain had 
to change its foreign policy, replacing hard power with soft.10 They uphold that Britain, 
although outranked by superpowers the United States of America (US) and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (Soviet Union), remained a key international actor in 1978 and that 
domestic gains in welfare, standards of living and civil rights argue against the portrayals of 
unequivocal British decline after 1945.11 
 The Callaghan government (1976-9) is among the least-researched British governments 
in the latter half of the 20th century. Prime Minister James Callaghan has not garnered much 
academic interest, and has fostered few biographies besides his own autobiography, Time and 
Chance.12 His immediate predecessor as Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, has garnered much 
more attention from scholars and biographers, as has his successor, Margaret Thatcher. Studies 
of the Callaghan government’s policies usually appear as smaller parts of more general works 
on British political history after 1945, and the few monographs on the subject deal with the 
Callaghan government together with the preceding Labour government of Harold Wilson 
(1974-6) as if they were one government.13 Studies of the Callaghan government is nearly 
                                                 
9 James Mayall, «Britain and Anglophone Africa», in Amadu Sesay (ed.), Africa And Europe. From partition to 
independence or dependence?  London 1986: 52. 
10 As defined by Christopher Hill in The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. Houndsmills 2003: 135: ‘Hard 
power is that which is targeted, coercive, often immediate and physical. Soft power is that which is indirect, 
long-term and works more through persuasion than force. […] Whereas hard power focuses on the target 
itself, soft power seeks primarily to change the target’s environment.’ 
11 See T.O. Lloyd, Empire, Welfare State, Europe. Oxford 2010; Keith Robbins, The Eclipse of a Great Power. 
London 1994. 
12 These are Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan. A life. Oxford 1997; Paul J. Deveney, Callaghan’s Journey to 
Downing Street. Basingstoke 2010; Harry Conroy, James Callaghan. London 2006. 
13 It is telling that one of the very few monographs devoted exclusively to the study of these two governments, is 
titled The Labour Government, 1974-79. This reflects the perceived oneness of these two governments as 
well as the lack of interest in studying the Callaghan government by itself. 
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always on Britain’s poor economic performance, the social unrest and the difficulties of 
controlling a minority government while there were serious divisions within the Labour party.14 
 Little scholarly attention has been paid to other aspects of the Callaghan government’s 
policies, and very little has been written about its foreign policy. It is revealing that Callaghan’s 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Owen (1977-79), is hardly 
mentioned in the literature; his absence becomes especially conspicuous when compared to the 
more extensive scholarly attention that has been given to other Foreign Secretaries, more 
controversial Labour personalities or even those of Callaghan’s ministers leading economic 
departments. This asymmetry in the literature may lead the reader, as stated by Ann Lane in the 
introductory quote to this chapter, to conclude that the domestic issues were all-encompassing 
and prevented the Callaghan government from engaging in foreign policy. Among the few 
foreign policy issues studied in connection with the Callaghan government are Britain’s 
relationship with the EEC, its ‘special relationship’ with the United States, the troubles in 
Northern Ireland, Cold War issues and the Rhodesia crisis.15 None of these issues were 
particular to the Callaghan government, further contributing to the perception of the Callaghan 
government as passive on foreign policy. Ann Lane, one of the few who have examined the 
foreign policy of the Callaghan government, disagrees with this portrayal, and finds that ‘[f]ar 
from being the end of an era in British decline, this period marked the first hesitant beginnings 
for a renewed British engagement with the rest of the world, albeit defined within more modern 
parameters.’16 She claims that Callaghan himself shaped Britain’s foreign policy, first as Harold 
Wilson’s Foreign Secretary and later as Prime Minister, and that he laid the foundations for 
many of the foreign policy successes that would later be attributed to Margaret Thatcher, among 
them Britain’s intimate relationship with the US, its ‘middle position’ in the Cold War and the 
resolution of the Rhodesia crisis.17 
                                                 
14 See Martin Holmes, The Labour Government, 1974-79. Political Aims and Economic Reality. London 1985; 
Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson (eds.), New Labour, Old Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan 
governments, 1974-79. London 2004. 
15 Rhodesia was a British colony in Southern Africa led by a white minority government. It had issued a 
unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, a provocation that Britain could not tolerate. As it could not 
attack its own citizens, and the Rhodesian whites rejected any settlement allowing for a transition to black 
majority rule, Britain was left politically paralysed and unable to resolve the situation. Britain received much 
criticism in the Commonwealth and the United Nations over the Rhodesia conflict and were eager to reach a 
negotiated settlement so that they might keep a modicum of influence in Rhodesia and avoid further 
criticism. For more information about the Rhodesia crisis, see chapter 2.2. 
16 Lane 2004: 168. 
17 Lane 2004: 168. This claim is supported by Dominic Sandbrook: ‘there was rather more continuity between 
Margaret Thatcher and her avuncular predecessor, ‘Sunny Jim’, than we often think – even though it would 
pain both left and right to admit it.’ See Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 
1974-1979. London 2012: xxi. 
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 If the Callaghan government’s general foreign policy has garnered little academic 
attention, even less has been given to its policy towards Britain’s former colonies. Although 
Callaghan’s belief in multilateral institutions led to closer contact with the Commonwealth of 
Nations, there is consensus in the literature that as the Commonwealth was flooded with newly-
independent nations, it ceased to be the intended tool for British influence and became instead 
an arena where former colonies could admonish Britain for what they perceived as imperialist 
behaviour,18 especially over South Africa and Rhodesia.19 Little has been written of Britain’s 
relationships with its former African colonies apart from the Rhodesia conflict, which, 
according to Ann Lane, ‘by 1978-9 was totally dominating the Foreign Secretary’s time’.20 
Works on Britain’s Africa policy in the late 1960s and 1970s – although these are few and far 
between – point out that Britain relied increasingly on economic tools and aid in order to 
influence Africa, and that British military intervention on the continent became increasingly 
unlikely; 21 Christopher Clapham portrays Britain as ‘simply uninterested in mobilising (or 
paying for) a clientele of African states. […] Few if any senior British politicians had any 
serious interest in Africa.’22 James Mayall, who perhaps comes closest to defining a British 
Africa strategy, describes Britain’s Africa policy in these years as ‘damage limitation’ and 
writes that its aim was to ‘transform the legacies of pre-eminence and Empire from liabilities 
into assets.’23 Britain’s strategy focused primarily on East and Southern Africa due to their 
conceived geo-strategic importance and the strength of British interests in these regions.24 
 Historical studies of the Callaghan government’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War 
are almost non-existent. Given the low interest in the Callaghan government’s foreign policy 
towards Africa, this is hardly surprising. What is perhaps more surprising is the near total lack 
of academic historical research into the Uganda-Tanzania War itself. The war is absent from 
most general works on African history, and is only mentioned in passing even in books about 
                                                 
18 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘imperialism’ as ‘a policy of extending a country’s power and 
influence through colonizaion, use of military force, or other means’. Source: Oxforddictionaries.com, 
Imperialism (accessed 20 March 2015). 
19 Examples of works expressing this view are Brian Harrison, Finding a role? The United Kingdom 1970-1990. 
Oxford 2010; Crawford Young, «The Heritage of Colonialism», in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild 
(eds.), Africa in World Politics. The African state system in flux. Houndsmills 2000; Paul Kennedy, The 
Realities Behind Diplomacy. Background Influences of British External Policy, 1865-1980. London 1981; 
David Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role. British Foreign Policy since 1945. London 1990. 
20 Lane 2004: 166. 
21 Crawford Young, “The Heritage of Colonialism”, in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in 
World Politics. The African state system in flux. Boulder 2000: 31. 
22 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the international system. The politics of state survival. Cambridge 1996: 87 
23 Mayall 1986: 53. 
24 Ibid: 62. 
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the history of Central East African countries. Historian George Roberts has written an article 
on the Uganda-Tanzania War, but although he uses British government sources from the 
National Archive, his focus is on the African actors rather than British policy.25 P. Godfrey 
Okoth has written an article about the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its reaction to 
the Uganda-Tanzania War.26 Outside the field of history, a few scholars from the social sciences 
and law studies have used the war as a case-study for testing theories.27 Journalists Martha 
Honey and Tony Avirgan have written a book about their reporting on the Uganda-Tanzania 
War. 28 It is a valuable contribution containing much information about the war, but as their 
sources are largely unknown and the book is clearly biased in favour of Tanzania and its 
President Julius Nyerere, the use of this book in academic research is at best problematic. 
However, Avirgan and Honey include a few sentences about Britain and the Uganda-Tanzania 
War: 
 
Britain now began playing an active behind-the-scenes role. Basically the 
Callaghan government decided that the time was ripe to remove Amin, even if in 
doing so Tanzania violated the OAU principle of territorial sanctity. […] It gave 
several million pounds, ostensibly to help rehabilitate the Kagera Salient, but 
                                                 
25 George Roberts, «The Uganda-Tanzania War, the fall of Idi Amin, and the failure of African diplomacy, 1978-
1979», in Journal of East African Studies, Volume 8, issue 4. 2014. 
26 P. Godfrey Okoth, «The OAU and the Uganda-Tanzania war, 1978-79», in Journal of African Studies, vol. 14, 
no. 3. 1987. The Organisation of African Unity was established in 1963 with the purpose of furthering unity 
and peace between the newly independent African states. The OAU promoted principles such as ‘i. Equality 
of all the member-states with each other; ii. Non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; iii. 
Respect for the existing frontiers of member states; and iv. Peaceful settlement of all disputes between 
member states.’ The principles of territorial integrity (iii) and non-interference (ii) are of particular relevance 
to the Uganda-Tanzania War as the two countries invaded each other and Tanzania overthrew Uganda’s 
government. As such, and especially because Uganda’s attempted annexation of the Kagera salient was the 
attempt of an independent African state to annex the territory of another, the Uganda-Tanzania War 
represented an important test for the OAU’s ability to mediate between and discipline its members. For more 
information about the OAU and its guiding principles, see Toyin Falola, Key Events in African History. A 
Reference Guide. London 2002: 239ff. 
27 See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford 2000; 
Daniel G. Acheson-Brown, «The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda: A Just War?», in International Third World 
Studies Journal and Review, Volume XII. 2001; Noreen Burrows, «Tanzania’s Intervention in Uganda: Some 
Legal Aspects», in The World Today. 1979; Olajide Aluko, «African Response to External Intervention in 
Africa since Angola», in African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 319. 1981. 
28 Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, War in Uganda. The Legacy of Idi Amin. Dar-es-Salaam 1982. Tony 
Avirgan and Martha Honey were American journalists based in Dar-es-Salaam, and had great knowledge of 
Central East Africa. After months of restricted access to information about the war, Avirgan and Honey were 
allowed to travel with the Tanzanian army during the siege of Kampala. Their book therefore provides 
valuable first-hand information about this siege, but all information relating to events before April 1979 has 
been collected by the journalists after the fact (and often from anonymous sources) and is therefore of a less 
reliable nature. It was on the orders of President Nyerere that they were finally allowed access to the war 
front, and their bias towards him is obvious – in fact, they even thank him in the books preface for not 
censoring the book. Nevertheless, War in Uganda remains a very important source of information about the 
war.  
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knowing that the money might find its way into the war effort. It also put some 
rather ineffectual pressure on British oil companies, urging them to cut supplies to 
Amin. This the companies were willing to do for only a couple of days. Most 
importantly, Britain acted as a messenger between the Kenyan and Tanzanian 
governments. Specifically, Britain forcefully conveyed to Nyerere Kenyan fears 
that Tanzania was attempting to install Obote. Nyerere evidently heeded these 
concerns and in turn used Britain to help explain Tanzania’s position to the Moi 
government.29 
 
This thesis is the first academic work to confirm Avirgan and Honey’s claims of British 
intervention, although it takes issue with their assessment of Britain’s pressure on the oil 
companies as ineffective, and there are aspects of the intervention that they have not recorded. 
Some former African soldiers and African politicians have mentioned the war in their memoirs, 
but these works can hardly be considered reliable and are of little use in this context. 
 Finally, a few words on the position of this thesis on the views presented in the literature. 
This thesis states that Britain’s transformation from wealthy empire and great power into an 
economically troubled nation-state in a superpower system had cost it some of its relative 
power: it no longer had the global military reach it had once possessed and the trade benefits of 
colonisation had been lost as the colonies reached independence and the economies and markets 
of the Commonwealth opened to the world. Projection of hard power towards other countries 
was becoming increasingly perceived as unacceptable, and Britain’s political control of its 
former colonies was substantially weakened, both by decolonisation and as the members of the 
Old Commonwealth shifted its allegiance increasingly towards the United States while the New 
Commonwealth was becoming increasingly ‘de-Britannisized’.30 But far from all of Britain’s 
global influence was lost – Britain remained a key international actor, although it now had to 
adjust its policies so that its agenda did not clash with those of the superpowers. Its position as 
the United States’ closest ally, reintegration into Europe, maintenance of Commonwealth ties, 
status as a nuclear power and membership of the United Nations Security Council all served to 
shore up Britain’s prominent position in the international system. Britain’s circumstances in the 
late 1970s, then, were not as dire as they are sometimes presented – it was still an important 
                                                 
29 Avirgan and Honey 1982: 103-4. 
30 W. David McIntyre, British Decolonization, 1946-1977. When, Why and How did the British Empire Fall? 
New York 1998: 122. Upon its establishment in 1931 the Commonwealth consisted of the United Kingdom 
and its Dominions: Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland. When British 
colonies gained independence after the Second World War, most became members of the Commonwealth. 
This caused the Commonwealth to change in size, character and political outlook, and in order to distinguish 
between these two phases of the Commonwealth’s history, the first constellation is often referred to as the 
‘Old Commonwealth’ and the second as the ‘New Commonwealth’. 
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actor actively pursuing global interests, although with less direct means to reach theirs 
objectives and more dependent on its partners than before. 
 As for the foreign policy of the Callaghan government, the position taken in this thesis 
differs from that often presented in the literature. In their single-minded focus on the domestic 
problems facing the Callaghan government, historians have come to neglect its foreign policy. 
This has led to the impression that ‘Britain’s defining characteristic in this period was a 
profound lack of confidence as a major power’31 and that the Callaghan government had no 
foreign policy. This is an absurd notion, which should be remedied through more research on 
the foreign policy of the period. 
 
1.2 Research objective and relevance 
Britain’s foreign policy and international status after the Second World War have been 
researched extensively. But as we have seen, historians have to some extent neglected the issue 
of British foreign policy under the Callaghan government, making Britain seem temporarily 
introvert and politically impotent. Insufficient attention has also been paid to Britain’s relations 
with former African colonies in the 1970s; as a result it appears as though Britain was relatively 
uninterested in Africa except for its involvement in the conflicts in Southern Africa. This thesis 
aims to address both these research lacunas through its study of Britain’s policy on the Uganda-
Tanzania War of 1978-79. Thereby it also touches upon a third research lacuna – historical 
research into the Uganda-Tanzania War has been almost non-existent. 
 The Uganda-Tanzania War represents a highly interesting case for studying the 
Callaghan government’s policy towards former African colonies. The Callaghan government 
was in power for the entire duration of the war, enabling us to study the government’s 
uninterrupted engagement with the conflict from its early beginnings to the end. The conflict is 
also ideal for such a study because it was the first ever war between two of Britain’s former 
African colonies. Involving Tanzania and Uganda (and affecting a third former colony, Kenya), 
the Uganda-Tanzania War represents an excellent opportunity for studying Britain’s interaction 
with former colonies at a time when the international society was wary of any sign of imperialist 
behaviour by former colonial powers. It is also interesting because it involved Uganda’s Amin 
regime, with which Britain had no relations and regularly expressed its dissatisfaction. The 
                                                 
31 Lane 2004: 154. 
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Uganda-Tanzania War was also a genuinely African War without direct roots in the Cold War 
or superpower politics. As such, and because it took place in a remote part of the globe and 
represented little threat to Britain’s own safety, it was a conflict to which Britain could choose 
whether to react. Finally, as will be demonstrated in section 1.4, the National Archives provide 
excellent sources for studying Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War. 
 This thesis has two research objectives. The first is the examination and analysis of 
Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War of 1978-79. The second research objective is the 
discussion of how this policy fits with the frequent portrayal of late-1970s Britain as it is often 
seen in the research literature - a former great power in unequivocal decline, led by a 
government whose ability and desire to pursue an active, global foreign policy was paralysed 
by domestic economic, social and political problems. Hopefully this thesis will contribute 
towards a more nuanced picture of Britain’s international role and global capacity for action in 
the late 1970s, and demonstrate that the Callaghan government was actively pursuing foreign 
policy interests on other continents. 
 Finally, a note on periodization is required. The primary time span of this study is 9 
October 1978 to 11 April 1979 – a period of roughly five and a half months. A case could easily 
have been made for choosing 30 October 1978 as the starting point for this thesis – this was, 
after all, the date on which the Uganda-Tanzania War officially broke out. But this study begins 
three weeks earlier, when the first border skirmishes occurred; the slow escalation of the 
conflict into full-blown war is reflected in the sources, and this provides valuable information 
about the prejudices and immediate reactions of diplomats and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) officials32 to the eruption and escalation of the conflict. 11 April 1979 has been 
chosen as the end point because this was the day when Tanzanian soldiers took Kampala and 
overthrew the Amin regime. As the Callaghan government lost the British general election 
shortly after and was replaced by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, studying 
Britain’s long-term policy towards Uganda and Tanzania after April 1979 falls outside the 
scope of this thesis. That being said, some reference will of course have to be made to events 
happening both before and after this period.  
 
 
                                                 
32 All officials referred to in this thesis are FCO officials unless otherwise specified. 
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1.3 Findings 
Britain’s defining characteristic in the late 1970s – even at its ‘nadir’ during the Winter of 
Discontent – was not ‘a profound lack of confidence as a major power’. Contradictory to the 
research literature’s frequent portrayal of the Callaghan government as introvert, politically 
impotent and unable to execute foreign policy, this thesis demonstrates that the Callaghan 
government pursued an active and opportunistic foreign policy aimed at maintaining and 
increasing Britain’s global influence and power. 
 When the Uganda-Tanzania War broke out in October 1978, the Callaghan government 
saw it as an opportunity to increase its global power by boosting its influence in Central East 
and Southern Africa. Decolonisation had cost Britain much of its influence on the African 
continent, and the pursuit of its interests was further impeded by its legacy as an imperialist 
power and its inability – or, as some African countries saw it, unwillingness – to bring about 
black majority rule in Rhodesia. As it was normally difficult for Britain to intervene in Africa 
without being accused of imperialist intervention in African affairs, the FCO officials saw the 
sudden outbreak of fighting between Tanzania and Uganda as an opening to increase British 
influence through support for Tanzania. This would allow Britain to demonstrate its support for 
Tanzania in the face of Ugandan aggression and contribute towards Uganda’s military defeat, 
which the officials hoped would lead to Amin’s overthrow. In this way Britain hoped to increase 
its influence in Central East Africa to the detriment of what it perceived as predominant 
communist influence in the region. The officials also hoped to use the Uganda-Tanzania war to 
achieve a mediated solution to the Rhodesia crisis – in their opinion the only way for Britain to 
retain a modicum of influence with black-majority regimes in the important region of Southern 
Africa where the West had been losing influence since decolonisation in the mid-1970s. The 
officials hoped that Britain’s support for Tanzania in the Uganda-Tanzania War would win it 
the trust of Tanzania’s President, Julius Nyerere, as the officials viewed his support of the 
Anglo-American mediation project as crucial to its success. The FCO officials’ instinctive 
desire to intervene in this small intra-African conflict in order to further British interests in 
Africa demonstrates that Britain in 1978 was still actively pursuing a foreign policy aimed at 
preserving and increasing Britain’s global power and influence, despite the domestic crisis.
 As open British interference in the Uganda-Tanzania War would elicit accusations of 
imperialist intervention, set an unfortunate precedent for British intervention in African 
conflicts and possibly endanger British citizens in Uganda, a two-pronged policy was 
developed: one official policy of non-intervention, and one covert policy of support for 
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Tanzania. Secret support for Tanzania remained Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War 
throughout the conflict, even as Tanzania transformed from victim to aggressor by invading 
Uganda in January 1979 and overthrowing its government. Britain’s initial attempts to 
dissociate itself from the conflict in phase two was not due to disapproval of Tanzania’s actions, 
but to the fact that secrecy had become paramount as Britain was now helping one African state 
overthrow the government of another. There was clearly no place for morals in Britain’s foreign 
policy when it was pursuing its interests. 
 Due to economic and political constraints Britain’s support for Tanzania had to be 
cheap, non-lethal and reactive. In phase one it provided Tanzania with material and economic 
support by expediting Tanzanian orders with British firms and offering ten mine detectors, the 
airfreight of a bridge, a £4 million credit extension and £2.5 million in aid. It also made British 
oil companies restrict supplies of petroleum products to Uganda, and intervened with other 
governments to keep supplies low. Although Britain continued to support Tanzania after its 
invasion of Uganda, Britain’s support became less tangible than in phase one and was largely 
diplomatic in character. Initially, the officials tried to avoid direct support for Tanzania while 
it was the aggressor, but as Amin’s fall seemed increasingly likely and Tanzanian pressure for 
British intervention increased, Britain suspended the Stansted flights33 and supported Tanzania 
diplomatically by intervening with Kenya and impeding a Ugandan request for discussion of 
Tanzania’s invasion by the United Nations Security Council. This thesis is the first archive-
based research effort to document Britain’s intervention in the Uganda-Tanzania War and 
demonstrates that its involvement was greater than has previously been known. 
 Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War was developed and championed by 
officials in the lower echelons of the FCO, primarily the East African Department (EAD) and 
the British High Commissioners to Tanzania and Nairobi. There was little controversy within 
the FCO over policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War, although there was some disagreement over 
conflicting British interests in Tanzania and Kenya in phase two. Although the FCO officials 
were eager to intervene in the conflict, they found it difficult to get their policy suggestions 
approved by ministries and ministers outside the FCO. This demonstrates that those outside the 
FCO doubted the importance of the conflict and the likelihood that intervention would yield 
                                                 
33 The ‘Stansted flights’, or ‘whiskey runs’ were regular flights between Stansted Airport in London and Entebbe 
International Airport in Uganda. The flights from Uganda brought coffee exports and other commodities to 
Britain, and returned with whiskey and other luxury items Amin used to satisfy his army. These flights 
continued after official diplomatic relations between Uganda and Britain were severed, and provoked much 
outrage both in Britain and internationally as they were perceived as essential to Amin’s ability to stay in 
power and continue his atrocious human rights abuses. 
12 
 
tangible results for Britain. Cheaper policy measures that didn’t require the approval of other 
ministers than David Owen – and, on occasion, the Prime Minister – were much more easily 
passed. Owen’s willingness to accept the policy suggestions of his officials and Callaghan’s 
occasional redirection of the policy conforms with the research literature’s portrayal of Owen 
as a weak Foreign Secretary and Callaghan as a Prime Minister with substantial influence on 
foreign policy. 
 Finally, this thesis makes a small contribution to our knowledge about the Uganda-
Tanzania War. Although this thesis is not primarily concerned with the war itself, it sheds some 
light on the roles played by Britain and the United States in the conflict, and shows that the 
international dimension of the conflict was probably more important for the outcome than has 
previously been known. 
 
1.4 Theoretical and methodological approach 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'theory' as 'a supposition or a system of ideas intended 
to explain something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be 
explained'.34 Although history tends to be a qualitative and empirical discipline, not often 
dependent on strict, overarching theoretical systems of thought, it is unavoidable that some 
'suppositions' and 'general principles' should affect our work and the conclusions we draw from 
the empirical evidence. Although this study, too, is primarily an empirical and qualitative effort, 
some of the basic assumptions guiding the analysis must be discussed. 
 One recurring question occupying scholars of international relations and political 
history is the influence of ‘agency’ versus that of ‘structures’. Some scholars take the view that 
the social world is shaped by social structures – such as globalization, gender roles, social 
hierarchies or the law – and that these set the perimeters for what actors can or cannot do. Others 
see structures as relatively unimportant, as they think actors – be they states, institutions, 
organisations, companies or individuals – can act freely and even change the social structures. 
Most scholarly work is situated somewhere between these two extremes, allowing both 
structures and actors influence. This study will also take this view: structures constrain actors’ 
possibilities and choices, but the power of agency should not be underestimated. 
                                                 
34 Oxforddictionaries.com, Theory (accessed 20 March 2015). 
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 In this study, the primary actors are diplomats, state officials, politicians, companies, 
states and international organisations. Some may claim that it is impossible to view states and 
organisations as actors with unified interests because each may consist of millions of 
individuals and groups with separate desires and agendas. But if these units cannot be 
considered actors, discussion of international relations quickly becomes unnecessarily difficult 
and perhaps even void of meaning. It is through states and organisations that individuals can 
come together and express their agency internationally, and therefore this thesis will ascribe 
them agency. 
 But even if states are actors, their interests, goals and policies must be determined by 
someone. This thesis is primarily concerned with the foreign policy of Great Britain, and as a 
parliamentary democracy, Britain’s policy is developed and determined by state officials and 
politicians on behalf of the people. The analysis will rest on the assumption that these officials 
and politicians make the decisions that they think will best serve to protect and further Britain’s 
national interests. However, complete rationality can never be assumed – actors are seldom 
given access to a complete set of information on which to base decisions, and even if they are 
the decision-making process could be corrupted by misinterpretations, misunderstandings, and 
misrepresentations of information. Also, as several individuals and departments may be 
involved in decision-making, the decision arrived at may in any case not be the objectively most 
rational, but the one that best unifies the views, needs and desires of all parties involved. For 
the purposes of this thesis, we will view the actors as capable of performing relatively rationally, 
while keeping in mind that they are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. 
 A few words must also be said about methodology. This thesis is an empirical study 
based primarily on source material from the National Archives (TNA) in London, Great Britain. 
Most of the material originates from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) series, but 
documents from the Prime Minister's Office (PREM) and the Cabinet Office (CAB) have also 
been utilised. Additionally, a few transcripts from Parliamentary Debates have been collected 
from the Hansard.35 
 The primary sources collected from the National Archives can be divided into two 
groups. The first group consists of telegrams, letters and minutes. The telegrams document the 
FCO's communication with British embassies and missions abroad, primarily the British High 
Commissions in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. The letters and minutes primarily document 
                                                 
35 Accessed at Hansard.millbanksystems.com. 
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communication within the FCO, between FCO officials and other departments or politicians, 
and between politicians. The other group of archival primary sources consists of policy papers 
written by FCO officials. These papers describe political challenges as well as possible 
solutions and their merits. They also include policy recommendations.  
 The primary sources used in this thesis are comprehensive and detailed, and as such 
provide an excellent basis for examining Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War. They 
demonstrate how British policy-makers viewed the Uganda-Tanzania War and Britain’s role in 
it and allows us to trace the development of British policy on the conflict. But the use of such 
primary sources is not without issues. One obvious flaw is that the source material is 
incomplete: some documents and parts of documents are missing, while others remain 
classified. However, this is not a major problem concerning the source material for this study, 
as many of the documents are duplicated and there are few obvious holes in the source material. 
The amount of classified information is negligible, mostly limited to a single word in each of 
the few documents concerned. Although few of the written documents are lost or classified, one 
must assume that some oral exchanges about the issue have been lost. Telephone calls, meetings 
and conversations are not always recorded in full, if at all, and so it is possible that we may lose 
some aspects of the decision making process. It is also possible that documents were overlooked 
when the source material was compiled. 
 In addition to the material gathered from the National Archives, autobiographies and 
authorised biographies constitute part of the primary source material for this thesis. Because 
such sources are highly problematic, I have been wary of relying too heavily on them; they are 
hardly objective, and often represent the views and agenda of a single person or group. 
Additionally, as they are often written well after events took place, the subjects may no longer 
remember them correctly or could misrepresent them in an attempt to redress or shape history 
to their advantage. They also tend to emphasise certain events or information, while other 
important issues or facts may be omitted completely. Thus, autobiographies and authorised 
biographies can be highly unreliable sources, but they can also provide information that is not 
available elsewhere, such as details of conversations, assessments of personalities and other 
first-hand information. They have been used only sparingly in this thesis and are hardly quoted; 
the Uganda-Tanzania War is not mentioned in any of them, but they have provided useful 
context and background information on certain issues and personalities that could not have been 
obtained elsewhere. 
 Although the source material has its weaknesses, the biggest element of uncertainty is 
always the historian herself. The act of writing history is the art of interpretation and analysis, 
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both highly subjective and uncertain activities. No matter the quality of the source material, 
there is always the possibility that the historian might misinterpret it: she could simply fail to 
understand it, she could piece the fragmented source material together incorrectly or she could 
emphasise the wrong parts of it. This could lead her to present a flawed picture of events, issues 
or personalities. I have tried to avoid these pitfalls, but it is important to keep them in mind 
whenever one is reading - or attempting to write - history. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
Finally, a few words on the structure of this study. Chapter 2 provides a short introduction to 
Britain’s domestic situation and foreign policy during the Callaghan years, 1976-9. Chapter 3 
is concerned with Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War. It gives a brief introduction to 
the war and explains the motivations and limitations shaping Britain’s policy on the conflict. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with Britain’s efforts to provide covert support to Tanzania in 
the Uganda-Tanzania War; chapter 4 deals with the first phase of the war, 9 October 1978 to 
22 January 1979, while chapter 5 deals with the war’s second phase, 23 January 1979 to 11 
April 1979. Chapter 6 is a brief discussion of whether Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania 
War lends itself to the interpretation that ‘Britain’s defining characteristic in this period was a 
profound lack of confidence as a major power’. 
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Chapter 2 
The Callaghan government and its foreign policy (1976-9) 
 
Foreign policy can never be abstracted from the domestic context out of which it springs.36 
 
Understanding Britain’s foreign policy in any given period requires knowledge of the domestic 
conditions in which it originated. This is certainly true for the Callaghan years, when Britain 
was plagued by deep economic crisis and social unrest. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter 
is to provide a short presentation of the domestic situation facing the Callaghan government, as 
well as a brief introduction to the general direction of its foreign policy. 
 
2.1 The Callaghan government and the domestic situation 
Leonard James Callaghan simultaneously became leader of the Labour Party and Britain’s 
Prime Minister on 5 April 1976.37 He was an experienced politician – he remains the only 
British statesman ever to have held all four ‘Great Offices of State’ in the course of his career38 
– and was considered by many an improvement on his ailing predecessor, Harold Wilson.39 
Callaghan is known for his extensive Cabinet consultations and defined himself as a ‘consensus 
leader’, but he also ‘felt it essential for a political leader to seize the initiative and provide an 
active and engaged sense of direction, from both the strategic and moral point of view’.40 This 
philosophy made Callaghan an engaged and active leader, not least on foreign policy. 
Callaghan’s expertise and leadership skills proved essential for holding his Labour 
government together – not only did he lose parliamentary majority on his first full day as Prime 
Minister,41 but he was also faced with major internal divisions between the radical and 
conservative wings of the Labour party.42 These divisions rendered unreliable the support of 
                                                 
36 Hill 2003: 37. 
37 Sue Pryce, Presidentializing the Premiership. London 1997: 150. 
38 James Callaghan was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1964 to 1967, Home Secretary from 1967 to 1970, 
Foreign Secretary from 1974 to 1976 and Prime Minister from 1976 to 1979. 
39 Chris Ballinger and Anthony Seldon, «Prime Ministers and Cabinet», in Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson 
(eds.), New Labour, Old Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79. London 2004: 175. 
40 Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan. A life. Oxford 1997: 485. 
41 Ballinger and Seldon 2004: 173-4. 
42 Callaghan is mostly portrayed as a representative of the Labour Party’s conservative wing or as ‘right of 
centre’. See Morgan 1997: 479; Lane 2004: 155; Childs 2006: 195. 
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Labour Members of Parliament for government policies, and in order to get policy through 
Parliament, Callaghan was forced to seek alliances with other parties; first with Scottish and 
Welsh nationalists, and later with the Liberal Party in the Lib-Lab Pact of 1977-8.43 
As if the difficulties of minority rule and a divided party were not enough, Callaghan 
had also inherited a Britain in economic and social crisis. The British economy had deteriorated 
in the 1970s as ‘growth stagnated, unemployment rose, sterling sagged and inflation soared.’44 
In an attempt to rescue the economy, the Callaghan government applied for a loan of £3.9 billion 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1976 – ‘the largest sum ever sought from it’45 
and a serious blow to Britain’s prestige.46 But by 1978 there were small signs that the 
government’s economic policies were working, as ‘[i]nflation was in single figures, oil 
revenues were rising and sterling was strong.’47  
This small progress had been achieved through close cooperation with the trade unions, 
who at the time ‘exerted an unprecedented peacetime influence’,48 representing ‘12.6 million 
union members in Britain, which probably meant they and their family members made up half 
the population.’49 The unions had accepted incomes policy50 for three years in order to combat 
the country’s soaring inflation. But when Callaghan suggested in the autumn of 1978 that they 
accept another year of incomes policy and a 5% cap on wage increases, the Trades Union 
Congress rejected him, ‘and even more seriously, so did the Labour Party Conference’.51 The 
end of incomes policy unleashed a wave of strikes, particularly in the public sector: 
 
The Ford motor workers started the rush by winning a 17 per cent pay increase in a strike 
immediately after the end of the incomes policy, and the strike of the lorry drivers caused 
more widespread difficulty and dislocation of industrial production than any other dispute, 
but what caught the public eye was the visible effect of the strike of the dustmen (at a 
hygienically cold time of winter), the first-ever strike by nurses, and the macabre problems 
caused by the strike of the Liverpool gravediggers.52 
                                                 
43 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th century. Harlow 2000: 233. 
44 Reynolds 2000: 238. 
45 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The office and its holders since 1945. London 2001: 385. 
46 Keith Robbins, The Eclipse of Great Power: Modern Britain 1870-1992. London 1994: 350. 
47 Robbins 1994: 351. 
48 Steven Fielding, «The 1974-9 Governments and ‘New’ Labour», in Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson 
(eds.), New Labour, Old Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79. London 2004: 286. 
49 Childs 2006: 202. 
50 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘incomes policy’ as ‘A government’s strategy for controlling inflation 
by attempting to restrict increases in wages and salaries’. Source: Oxforddictionaries.com, Incomes policy 
(accessed 14 May 2015). 
51 Lowe 2009: 609. 
52 T. O. Lloyd, Empire, Welfare State, Europe. Oxford 2010: 414. 
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The months of strikes and social unrest between September 1978 and February 1979 became 
known as the ‘Winter of Discontent’,53 and proved ruinous for Callaghan: 
 
All the same, no sane observer could possibly deny that the Winter of Discontent marked 
a dreadful nadir in modern British history. It might not have been as bad as Tory 
propaganda later claimed, and not even Moss Evans and Alan Fisher could be blamed for 
the freakishly bad weather. But even so, this was a crisis that saw ports, schools and railway 
stations shut down, businesses starved of essential supplies, farmers forced to slaughter 
their livestock for lack of fodder and thousands of workers defying not just the government 
but their own representatives. […] The sick genuinely went untreated; the dead did go 
unburied. […] For a brief period, Wilson and Callaghan seemed to have restored calm, but 
that illusion had not just been dispelled by the Winter of Discontent, it had been smashed 
into a thousand pieces. […] Never had the prospects for industrial peace seemed bleaker; 
never had the British state seemed so helpless and irrelevant.54 
 
The crisis turned into a true public relations nightmare when Callaghan, returning sun-tanned 
from a summit in Guadeloupe in January 1979, said ‘something perilously close to ‘Crisis, what 
Crisis?’’.55 These remarks caused general outrage, and he was soon castigated for being out of 
touch with reality. The Callaghan government was overthrown by a vote of no confidence in 
the House of Commons on 28 March 1979, and lost the general election to Margaret Thatcher 
and the Conservative Party on 3 May. It was to be another 18 years before Britain would again 
trust a Labour government to rule it. 
 
2.2 The Callaghan government and foreign policy 
As we have seen, the domestic context out of which Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania 
War grew was one of political, economic and social crisis. The Winter of Discontent was bound 
to affect the government’s willingness and ability to pursue foreign policy, as its attention was 
fixed on domestic developments and crisis management. Britain’s foreign policy was also 
affected by Callaghan’s acceptance of ‘the severe limitations imposed on British influence 
through its declining economic and strategic power’.56 Britain’s relative loss of international 
                                                 
53 The term ‘Winter of Discontent’ comes from the opening lines of William Shakespeare’s play Richard the III: 
‘Now is the winter of our discontent / Made glorious summer by this sun of York; […]’ 
54  Sandbrook 2012: 758-9. Moss Evans and Alan Fisher were leading trade unionists. 
55 Kenneth O. Morgan, «Was Britain dying?», in Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson (eds.), New Labour, Old 
Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79. London 2004: 306. 
56 Morgan 1997: 622. 
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status and power was obvious by 1978, and as it came to terms with its new position as one of 
several great powers in a superpower world, Britain increasingly pursued its goals through 
alliances and exertion of soft power. But Britain’s overarching foreign policy objective 
remained the same as it had always been: the furthering and protection of Britain’s global 
interests and status as a great power. Thus, Britain’s power was not lost, but transformed: even 
at its ‘nadir’ in 1978, Britain remained a key player in the international system, actively 
pursuing its traditional foreign policy objectives in distant parts of the globe. Ann Lane has 
described these years as ‘the first hesitant beginnings of a renewed British engagement with the 
rest of the world’.57 
The Callaghan government’s foreign policy was similar to that of the preceding Wilson 
government, in which Callaghan had been Foreign Secretary. Callaghan continued to dominate 
foreign policy as Prime Minister, especially after his controversial appointment of Dr David 
Owen, a 38-year old junior FCO Minister of State, to Foreign Secretary in February 1977.58 
Although Callaghan had faith in Owen’s abilities and talents, Owen was young and 
inexperienced; he garnered some notice for his role in the Anglo-American Rhodesia mediation 
project, but has not been remembered by posterity as a particularly strong or memorable Foreign 
Secretary. As Prime Minister, Callaghan 
 
was focused on peacemaking in Rhodesia and the Middle East, on strengthening relations 
between the western heads of government, and especially on continuing to promote détente 
with the Soviet Union (and indirectly with China) and the process of strategic arms 
limitation, already underway. As events turned out, of course, he was inextricably absorbed 
with Britain’s economic problems, his main immediate priority until the conclusion of the 
IMF negotiations at the end of 1976. But thereafter he threw himself increasingly into 
international matters.59  
 
                                                 
57 Lane 2004: 154. 
58 Morgan 1997: 589. Although Callaghan’s influence on foreign policy is often cited in the literature, David 
Owen remembers things rather differently in his memoirs: ‘I was amazed how Jim consciously chose not to 
interfere, once actually going to the lengths of ringing me up to apologise for fixing up a meeting with 
President Kaunda in Kano by telephone without being able to consult with me first.’ See David Owen, Time 
To Declare. Second Innings. London 2009: 169. 
59 Morgan 1997: 588. 
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It was Callaghan’s intention ‘to sustain and even enhance British influence, but through 
development of political economic strength rather than military force.’60 Even so, ‘[m]uch of 
British foreign policy in these years was reactive and not particularly inspired’.61 
 Two of the foreign policy issues of the Callaghan period must be mentioned as they are 
of some interest to this thesis. The first is the Iranian revolution of 1978-9. Its relevance lies in 
its effect on the global oil market, as reduced supply of crude oil from Iran to the Central East 
African countries affected not only the Uganda-Tanzania War, but also Britain’s policy on it. 
The second issue of relevance is the Rhodesia crisis. Rhodesia was a British colony in 
Southern Africa led by a white majority government. In order to avoid independence under 
black majority rule, it issued a unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 1965.62 
Britain could not tolerate such embarrassing disobedience from its colonies, but nor could it put 
down the rebellion by attacking its own citizens. Britain’s position was further complicated by 
the fact that it was pressured by other African states into adopting the policy of NIBMAR – ‘no 
independence before majority African rule.’ As the Rhodesian white minority government, led 
by Ian Smith, rejected any settlement allowing for a transition to black majority rule, Britain 
was left politically paralysed. Britain’s inability to resolve the conflict was highly embarrassing 
and elicited frequent accusations that it was protracting the conflict in order to avoid 
independence under black majority rule, especially from the so-called Frontline states.63 The 
communist bloc supported black Rhodesian guerrilla movements hoping to oust the Smith 
regime by force. This increased the urgency of obtaining a negotiated settlement, as Britain 
believed that if the guerrilla movements were to gain power Britain would lose its influence 
over this rich territory to the communists. Therefore, a renewed Anglo-American mediation 
project was launched in 1977, led by David Owen and his American counterpart, Cyrus Vance. 
Their goal was a conference where the white minority government of Rhodesia could negotiate 
a transition to black majority rule with the guerrilla movements. This was difficult because 
neither side wanted such a solution.64 Owen and Vance worked hard to achieve a settlement in 
                                                 
60 Lane 2004: 155. 
61 Morgan 1997: 623.  
62 Reynolds Harlow 2000: 211. 
63 Brian Lapping, End of Empire. London, 1985: 523. The Frontline states was an organisation formed by 
Southern African countries already under black majority rule to pursue the goal of black majority rule in 
Rhodesia and South Africa. The member countries often lent their territory to the guerrilla movements, and 
thus became involved in the conflict. Tanzania’s President, Julius Nyerere was Chairman of the Frontline 
states. 
64 For further information about the Anglo-American mediation attempt, see M. Tamarkin, The Making of 
Zimbabwe. Decolonization in regional and international politics. Oxford 1990: 185ff. 
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1977-79, and the Rhodesia conflict finally ended with a settlement between the guerrilla leaders 
and the white minority regime, called the Lancaster House Agreement, in December 1979.65 
Rhodesia became independent as Zimbabwe under black majority rule. As this thesis is the first 
to demonstrate, there is a connection between Britain’s need to resolve the Rhodesia crisis and 
its policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War. 
Finally, a few words must be said about Britain’s relationship with Africa in the late 
1970s. Decolonisation had cost Britain its means of direct influence in Africa, and its influence 
was further hampered by its imperialist legacy and inability to resolve the Rhodesia crisis. As 
Europe was rapidly becoming the main focus of Britain’s foreign policy and little funding was 
available for an active Africa policy, the FCO aimed to transform its African ‘liabilities into 
assets’ in the cheapest possible way.66 Its main focus was Southern and Eastern Africa, as these 
regions were rich in natural resources and geo-strategically important. Located in the 
geographical centre of Britain’s African area of interest, Central East Africa was a natural target 
for its new foreign policy. But in order for British influence and interests to flourish, two 
conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, the Central East African countries must be ruled by regimes 
friendly – or at least, neutral – to Britain; and secondly, the region must be peaceful and 
politically stable. At the time of independence, these conditions were to some extent fulfilled, 
but by 1978, the situation had worsened dramatically. 
As the former colonial ruler of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda Britain had a long 
historical connection with Central East Africa and retained substantial interests there. But by 
1978, Britain had lost much influence in the region. Diplomatic relations with Uganda had been 
severed in 1977 due to President Idi Amin Dada’s67 anti-Western attitude and his hostility 
towards British interests. Britain desperately wanted Amin overthrown, and would not consider 
re-establishing relations while he remained President of Uganda.68 Britain’s relationship with 
                                                 
65 Lowe 2009: 717. 
66 Mayall 1986: 53. 
67 Idi Amin Dada held only a fourth grade education, but had become a professional soldier in the King’s African 
Rifles. He had risen to the status of Army Chief of Staff by 25 October 1971, when he overthrew President 
Milton Obote and appointed himself President of Uganda. The Amin regime is infamous for its human rights 
abuses and Amin’s erratic behaviour. He was subject to many assassination attempts during his eight-year 
rule, but had a talent for survival. While President of Uganda, Amin continued to promote himself, finally 
ending up with the full title ‘Al-haji Field Marshal Dr. Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC, CBE. Life President 
of the Republic of Uganda.’ 
68 By 1978 Britain was attempting to isolate and embarrass Amin whenever opportunities arose: it lobbied 
intensely for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to launch an investigation into the alleged 
atrocities of the Amin regime; it tried to keep Amin from attending Commonwealth conferences, most 
famously by denying him landing rights in Britain so that he could not attend the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting there in 1977; David Owen, a professional neurologist, has since written a paper 
alleging that Amin was insane and admitted in a 2003 BBC interview to having inquired of the MI6 if they 
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Tanzania was strained by ideological differences. Above all, their relationship was damaged by 
the Rhodesia crisis, over which President Julius Nyerere69 severed relations with Britain in 
1965. Although relations were later restored, the relationship remained chilly as Tanzania 
continued to accuse Britain of imperialist intervention in Africa. Kenya had long been among 
Britain’s most important African allies, but by the late 1970s Britain’s influence there was being 
replaced by that of the United States.70 Britain’s influence waned as its poor economic 
performance prevented it from extending to Kenya the preferential economic treatment 
necessary to remain its main patron, and the accession of a new Kenyan President, Daniel arap 
Moi, in August 1978, left the future of Anglo-Kenyan relations uncertain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
would be willing to assassinate Amin, a request they declined. There were many British organisations 
working for Amin’s overthrow, and Britain’s contempt for him was obvious by the late 1970s. 
69 Julius Nyerere was one of Africa’s most prominent and respected statesmen and remained President of 
Tanzania from independence until 1985. He transformed Tanzania into a one-party state and tried to keep 
Tanzania non-aligned in the Cold War. However, his adherence to the ideology of African socialism 
(ujamaa), support for Soviet-backed guerrilla movements in Southern Africa and close defence relationship 
with China gave Britain the impression that Nyerere was leaning towards alignment with the communist 
bloc. 
70 Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence. London 2012: 292. 
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Chapter 3 
Great Britain and the Uganda-Tanzania War 
 
The Government condemn the Ugandan invasion and have conveyed an expression of 
sympathy to the Tanzanian government. We hope there will be an early end to the fighting 
and that a peaceful settlement can be quickly achieved based on the OAU principle of 
respect for territorial integrity. […] We believe African disputes should, wherever possible, 
be settled in an African context.71 
 
This was Britain’s officially stated policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War for the duration of the 
conflict. However, this chapter will demonstrate that – except for its genuine condemnation of 
the Ugandan invasion – Britain’s actual policy on the conflict was almost the complete opposite 
of its official one. Despite its publicly stated intentions to stay out of the conflict, Britain 
secretly intervened in favour of Tanzania, disregarding its own official promotion of a quick, 
peaceful, mediated solution in order to ensure Uganda’s military defeat by Tanzania. 
 This discrepancy between official and actual policy was a result of conflicting British 
interests. The officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wanted to intervene in the 
Uganda-Tanzania War, which they saw as an opportunity to preserve and increase British 
influence in Africa. By assisting Tanzania in a war that could potentially cause Amin’s 
overthrow, they thought that British and Western influence might replace communist 
predominance in Central East Africa. They also hoped that any increase in British influence 
over Nyerere could be used to achieve a mediated resolution of the Rhodesia crisis, Britain’s 
top priority in Africa in the late 1970s. But external factors and competing British interests put 
severe limitations on the policy Britain could pursue on the Uganda-Tanzania War: it must be 
cheap, non-lethal, reactive and – above all – secret. 
 
3.1 Central East Africa and the Uganda-Tanzania War 
In order to understand the development of Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War, basic 
knowledge about the conflict is necessary. Therefore, this subchapter will provide an 
introduction to Central East Africa’s political situation in the late 1970s and to the Uganda-
Tanzania War itself. 
                                                 
71 Defence and foreign affairs debate in the House of Lords, 8 November. Speaking Note for Lord Goronwy-
Roberts. Uganda (defensive), 7 November 1978, FCO 31/2390/64, TNA. 
26 
 
Central East Africa was a volatile region in the 1970s. Externally, regional stability was 
threatened from the north by the conflicts in the Horn of Africa72 and from the south by the 
Southern African conflict over black majority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa.73 If these 
conflicts spilled into Central East Africa they could destabilise the region, which would be 
detrimental to Britain’s interests there. Internally, the region’s stability was threatened by the 
bad relationships between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Attempts had been made to unify these 
countries politically and economically – most famously with the establishment of the East 
African Community (EAC) in 196774 – but when the EAC collapsed in 1977, the region was 
more disintegrated than ever, and tensions were high as the former member countries squabbled 
over its remaining assets. 75 The relationship between Kenya and Tanzania had been 
deteriorated as the EAC collapsed, and deteriorated further when Tanzania unilaterally closed 
their common border in 1977. Kenya’s relationship with Uganda was also troubled, and had hit 
a low point when Amin threatened to annex much of Western Kenya in 1976. Although Kenya 
never trusted Amin again, it allowed the lucrative Ugandan import trade to continue.76 By 1978 
and the breakout of the Uganda-Tanzania War, Kenya felt encircled by what it perceived as 
hostile regimes and had returned to its traditional isolationist foreign policy.77 
 Tanzania’s relationship with Uganda had deteriorated with the Amin coup in 1971. 
Tanzania granted exile to Uganda’s ex-President, Milton Obote, and refused to recognise Amin 
as President of Uganda. Instead, Nyerere allowed Obote to establish guerrilla training camps in 
Tanzania, and supported his unsuccessful attempt to invade Uganda in September 1972. 78 This 
                                                 
72 The Horn of Africa was highly unstable and volatile in the 1970s. Ethiopia was destabilised in 1974 by the 
Derg coup and the Ethiopian Civil War (1974-91) and fought Eritrean secessionism in the Eritrean War of 
Independence (1961-91). Somali irredentism also threatened regional stability. As the Somali nation had 
been divided between Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya at independence, Somali irredentists wanted to 
unify the Somali nation in one country, Greater Somalia. This caused the Ethio-Somali War (1977-8) and 
threatened Kenya. Somalis made incursions into Kenyan territory from the north, and Somalis living in 
northern Kenya had tried to secede to join Greater Somalia in what became known as the Shifta War (1963-
7).  
73 South Africa had been nominally independent from Britain since 1910 and was led by a white minority 
regime. Its infamous apartheid system of racial segregation allowed the black majority population very 
limited rights, and along with South Africa’s frequent military and political intervention in neighbouring 
states was the source of much domestic and international criticism. South Africa initially supported the white 
minority regime in Rhodesia, but from the mid-1970s started working for a mediated settlement in order to 
avoid another potential communist regime and/or civil war on its borders. 
74 The East African community (1967-77) was an economic union modelled after the Common Market of 
Europe. For more information about the EAC, see Thomas P. Ofcansky and Roger Yeager, Historical 
dictionary of Tanzania. London 1997: 70-71. 
75 Hornsby 2012: 235. 
76 Uganda was a land-locked state, and almost all of its imports passed through Kenya, including all its 
petroleum products. 
77 Hornsby 2012: 320. 
78 Avirgan and Honey 1983: 35. 
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escalated the conflict between Tanzania and Uganda to the brink of war, and the two parties 
signed a peace treaty in Mogadishu the following month. The Mogadishu Agreement called for 
a cessation of military operations and the establishment of a demilitarised zone stretching 
sixteen kilometres on each side of the Tanzania-Uganda border. It also demanded an end to 
hostile propaganda and ‘subversive forces’ conspiring against one country from the territory of 
the other.79 Although the relationship between Tanzania and Uganda remained hostile in the 
years following the agreement, open conflict did not erupt until the start of the Uganda-
Tanzania War in October 1978. 
 The political instability of Central East Africa and lack of pro-British regimes made it 
difficult for Britain to expand its influence in the region. The future of British interests was 
uncertain in a region threatened by destabilisation from without and within, and the unfriendly 
relations between the local regimes meant that increased British influence in one state could 
easily lessen its influence in another. Because of its interest in Central East Africa and its fear 
that the region might be destabilised, Britain followed the escalating conflict between Tanzania 
and Uganda in October 1978 with particular interest. 
The Uganda-Tanzania War broke out on 30 October 1978 and lasted until 11 April 1979. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the war has been divided into two distinct phases: the first 
covering Uganda’s invasion of Tanzania in the autumn of 1978, and the second covering 
Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda in the spring of 1979.80 Although the precise reasons for the 
outbreak of the war have never been fully documented, the consensus is that it was started by 
Uganda. 81 Ugandan troops crossed the border into Tanzania on 9 October 1978, triggering three 
weeks of border skirmishes between the two countries. Amin made repeated accusations that 
                                                 
79 Avirgan and Honey 1983: 36. 
80 Although the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania formally lasted only two weeks, sporadic fighting seems to have 
occurred until the Tanzanian counter-invasion in January 1979. Therefore, phase one covers the period from 
9 October 1978 to 22 January 1979 and is covered in chapter 4. Phase two covers the period from 23 January 
1979 to 11 April 1979 and is the subject of chapter 5. 
81 Differing interpretations have been offered about the origins of the war. One interpretation is that the war 
started when an anti-Amin army mutiny was fought back in Mbarara in October 1978. The disloyal troops 
were forced to retreat towards the Tanzanian border, finally crossing it on 9 October and triggering the first 
border clashes. Amin subsequently ordered the Ugandan army to invade Tanzania in the hopes that it would 
rally to his side to fight an external enemy. Although not discussed in this thesis, this view is supported by 
my sources. For examples of this explanation, see Phares Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A story of 
unfulfilled hopes. New Jersey 1992: 113-4, or Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
intervention in international society. Oxford 2002: 113. A second interpretation claims that the war was a 
premeditated action by Amin, who allegedly started preparing his invasion in May 1979. For an example of 
this explanation, see Avirgan and Honey 1983: 51. 
28 
 
Tanzania had invaded Uganda, and on 30 October 1978 he ordered the Ugandan army to invade 
Tanzania.82  
The Ugandan invasion caught Tanzania by surprise and its army completely unprepared. 
In compliance with the Mogadishu Agreement of 1972, Tanzanian troop deployment in the 
border area was minimal, allowing Ugandan soldiers to advance as far as the Kagera River by 
the town Kyaka without meeting much resistance. The Ugandan army blew up the river’s only 
bridge, and on 1 November 1978 Amin announced the annexation of the occupied area, known 
as the Kagera salient.83 The Ugandan invasion evoked international condemnation from African 
and non-African actors alike. The near-universal condemnation of his invasion is believed to 
have taken Amin by surprise, and faced with international pressure and full Tanzanian 
mobilisation, he announced the withdrawal of his troops on 14 November;84 but Tanzania 
refused to acknowledge that Uganda had in fact withdrawn, claiming instead that fighting was 
ongoing and that its army was still expelling Ugandan troops from Tanzania. Although no 
formal peace was announced, the conflict was commonly believed to be over by December 
1978. 
 Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda on 21 January 1979 therefore took the world by surprise. 
As Uganda had the higher ground on the formal Uganda-Tanzania border and had previously 
exploited this advantage to launch numerous attacks on Tanzania, it has been suggested that the 
Tanzanian invasion was motivated primarily by a desire to push on to a more easily defensible 
point on the Ugandan side of the border.85 However, the most commonly believed explanation 
is that Tanzania invaded Uganda in order to destabilise the Amin regime. As Tanzania would 
have risked international condemnation for a full-scale invasion of Uganda, they sought instead 
to ‘liberate’ the Ugandan border areas from Amin’s control with the help of Ugandan exile 
guerrillas, hoping that this would instigate an anti-Amin rebellion that would cause his 
downfall.86 By late February 1979 it was obvious that this would not happen, and Tanzania 
                                                 
82 Avirgan and Honey 1983: 61. 
83 The Kagera River starts in Burundi and Rwanda and runs north along the Rwanda-Tanzania border. It then 
turns east and follows the Tanzania-Uganda border for a while before turning south into Tanzania. The river 
turns north again by the town Kyaka, about 28 kilometres from the Tanzania-Uganda border. The river then 
crosses the border into Uganda, where it empties into Lake Victoria. Thus, the river separates an area of 
roughly 1800 square kilometres from the rest of Tanzania, and this area is called the ‘Kagera salient’. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘salient’ as ‘A piece of land […] that juts out to form an angle.’ Source: 
Oxforddictionaries.com, Salient (accessed 25 March 2015). 
84 Wheeler 2002: 114. 
85 Avirgan and Honey 1983: 69. 
86 Wheeler 2002: 114. 
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decided to march on Kampala in order to rid itself of the continuous security threat that the 
Amin regime represented. 
 Amin’s Arab and communist friends had refused to support his 1978 invasion. But the 
Tanzanian invasion of Uganda provoked Amin’s equally erratic friend, Libyan dictator 
Muammar Gaddafi,87 into action. By mid-February 1979 Libyan troops and war supplies started 
arriving in Uganda.88 But the Ugandan army was disintegrating, leaving Libyan troops to do 
most of the fighting. By March Gaddafi realised that the Amin regime could no longer 
effectively defend itself, and started pulling his troops out of Uganda. In a final effort to save 
Amin, Libya issued an ultimatum to Tanzania on 25 March stating that if Tanzania did not 
withdraw from Uganda, Libya would declare war on it – but Nyerere refused to comply. 
Realising that he would soon be overthrown, Amin made a last-ditch attempt to save his regime 
by asking the United Nations Security Council for a resolution against the Tanzanian invasion. 
However, neither African nor non-African members of the Security Council would support his 
request, and so the Tanzanian army invaded the Ugandan capital, Kampala, on 11 April 1979. 
Amin fled with his family into life-long exile,89 and the Tanzanian army proceeded to clear 
Northern Uganda of his supporters.  
 In the weeks prior to the fall of Kampala, Ugandan exiles had formed an organisation 
called the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). Members of this organisation became the 
new government of Uganda, and a teacher named Yusuf Lule was appointed President. But 
post-Amin Uganda turned out to be politically unstable, and Lule was replaced as President by 
former Ugandan Attorney General Godfrey Binaisa only one month after his appointment.90 
Binaisa was himself ousted from the Presidency after less than a year. Milton Obote won the 
following 1980 general election, but soldier-cum-politician Yoweri Museveni refused to accept 
the result and started the Ugandan Bush War (1981-6); Thus Uganda, although rid of Amin, 
slid into political instability and civil war.91 
                                                 
87 Amin and Gaddafi became friends in February 1972, and Gaddafi sent soldiers to help Amin repulse the 1972 
guerrilla invasion. In exchange for Gaddafi’s friendship and support, Amin renounced Israel and pledged 
allegiance to the Muslim cause, although Uganda was primarily a Christian country. For more information 
about Amin’s relationship with Gaddafi, see Alison Pargeter, Libya. The rise and fall of Qaddafi. London 
2012: 127-9. 
88 John K. Cooley, The Libyan Sandstorm. London 1983: 256. The number of Libyan soldiers sent to Amin’s 
assistance in the Uganda-Tanzania War have been estimated between 1500 and 3000. 
89 Amin first fled to Libya, but later moved to Saudi Arabia, where he died in 2003. 
90 Oliver Furley, «Britain and Uganda from Amin to Museveni», in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict Resolution 
in Uganda. Oslo 1989: 281. 
91 Furley 1989: 285. 
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 The Uganda-Tanzania War also had dire consequences for Tanzania. It had caused 
major destruction of life and property in the Kagera salient, and the Tanzanian economy, 
already suffering from low coffee prices and excessive imports, crumbled under the cost of the 
war.92 The war also led President Nyerere, who had planned to step back in 1980, to take another 
term as President as he did not wish to risk political instability while Tanzania was weakened. 
 Finally, a note on the international aspects of the war. Libya was the only country to 
intervene militarily in the conflict. Kenya, although not involved in the fighting, was also an 
important actor as it neighboured both Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya had the power to stop all 
of land-locked Uganda’s essential imports, including war materials and fuel supplies, as these 
transited Kenya on their way to their destination. Although Kenya intended to stay neutral, 
actual neutrality proved nearly impossible; allowing Ugandan imports to pass its borders would 
constitute indirect support for Uganda’s aggressive invasion, while stopping them would be 
seen as an act of support for Tanzania. Offers of mediation were extended to Tanzania and 
Uganda by Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and the OAU, but mediation proved impossible as neither 
party would participate in phase one unless its adversary would apologise. Uganda was willing 
to accept mediation in phase two, but Tanzania demanded that the mediator condemn Amin, 
and that Amin apologise for invading Tanzania, renounce his claims on Tanzanian territory and 
pay war reparations. As Tanzania was at that time itself invading Uganda, these demands ‘were 
regarded by most people as so unacceptable both to Uganda and to any likely mediator 
(particularly the OAU) that they were generally seen as tantamount to a refusal by Tanzania to 
accept mediation under any reasonable circumstances.’93 No non-African actors interfered 
publicly in the Uganda-Tanzania War, but as this thesis will demonstrate, that does not mean 
that they kept out it. 
 
3.2 Britain’s motivations for intervention in the Uganda-Tanzania War 
The purpose of this subchapter is the discussion of Britain’s motivation for intervention in the 
Uganda-Tanzania War. It argues that although the Uganda-Tanzania War was an unforeseen 
conflict, British officials quickly recognised that the war could be used to further Britain’s 
global power and status by increasing its influence in Africa. This was to be achieved through 
the pursuit of two goals 
                                                 
92 Falola 2002: 258. 
93 Memorandum. The Tanzania/Uganda War: Act 2, 30 April 1979, FCO 31/2638/16, TNA. 
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 The first goal the British officials hoped to achieve through intervention in the Uganda-
Tanzania War was increased British influence in Central East Africa. They believed that the 
communist countries enjoyed more influence in the region than Britain did. Although Kenya 
remained a faithful ally to the West, British officials viewed Tanzania’s adherence to the 
ideology of African Socialism and its close defence cooperation with China as a sign of 
significant communist influence. Uganda’s Amin regime, on the other hand, was erratic and 
frequently followed anti-Western policies in order to ensure continued Arab and communist 
financial support. Britain felt its own influence in the region slipping away – it had no 
diplomatic relations with Uganda at all and therefore no influence there, Anglo-Tanzanian 
relations were strained, and British influence in Kenya was being gradually replaced by that of 
stronger patrons. 
 Therefore, FCO officials were keen to take advantage of the opportunities for increased 
influence offered by the Uganda-Tanzania War. In the years leading up to the conflict, the 
Soviet Union had supplied arms to both Uganda and Tanzania. When Uganda subsequently 
used its weapons to invade Tanzania, the Soviet Union was embarrassed, and opted to lay low: 
 
The Russians are likely to try to maintain a low profile. They will be embarrassed at Amin's 
action and are vulnerable to African criticism for having armed and trained his forces. Their 
public reaction so far has been to profess support for the principle of inviolability of 
frontiers, an implicit disavowal of Amin.94 
 
The FCO officials saw this as an opportunity for the West to take advantage of the Soviet 
Union’s blunder and increase its own influence in the region at the communists’ expense. 
Therefore, they were eager to preclude any communist moves to rectify their mistake: ‘we want 
to avoid giving an opening for Soviet or Cuban intervention and the introduction of an east-
west dimension.’95 The knowledge that Tanzania was unlikely to get assistance from other 
Western countries led the British officials to conclude that Britain should provide some before 
the communists did: 
 
We must take into account the possibility that if we appear unwilling to help Tanzania at a 
time of need, she may turn to others, such as the Russians who do have instant equipment. 
                                                 
94 Uganda/Tanzania: Considerations for UK policy, 7 November 1978, FCO 31/2390/65, TNA. 
95 Uganda/Tanzania: Considerations for UK policy, 7 November 1978, FCO 31/2390/65, TNA. 
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We should derive some encouragement from the fact that when the chips were down 
Nyerere turned to us.96  
 
Therefore, the EAD officials deemed it crucial that Britain intervene in the conflict in an attempt 
to replace communist influence in Central East Africa: ‘we do not want to leave the field to 
them.’97  
The officials believed that successful intervention in the war could lead to increased 
British influence in both Uganda and Tanzania. Although Britain’s relationship with Tanzania 
was cool, it had ‘a growing bilateral interest in Tanzania, including trade which is significant.’98 
Therefore, the officials would like to see increased British influence there, but this could only 
come about if Tanzania was politically stable, and Britain believed that a prerequisite for such 
stability was that Nyerere remain in power. As they believed that Tanzania’s defeat in the 
Uganda-Tanzania War could potentially lead to Nyerere’s overthrow, they wanted to shore up 
his position ‘if only, to put it at its absolute lowest, because there is enough trouble elsewhere 
in Africa.’99 Increasing Britain’s influence in Tanzania, then, was not a top priority, but a nice 
potential benefit from interference in the conflict. 
Britain’s still had substantial interests in Uganda, and was determined to increase its 
influence there.100 As there could be no rapprochement between Britain and Uganda while the 
Amin regime survived, any revival of British influence in Uganda was contingent upon its 
overthrow. The recent escalation of anti-Amin army mutinies and assassination attempts 
convinced the British officials that Amin’s position was precarious, and that the war provided 
an excellent opportunity to ‘exploit what openings may occur to contribute towards Amin’s 
downfall.’101 They believed that a Ugandan military victory – or even a mediated withdrawal – 
could strengthen Amin’s domestic position, and would therefore be contrary to British interests. 
On the other hand, they believed that a ‘military defeat or repulse could precipitate the downfall 
of Amin’, 102 and decided to assist Tanzania in order to ‘curb and if possible to remove Amin.’103 
                                                 
96 FCO to Peter J. S. Moon, 10 November 1978, FCO 31/2375/35, TNA. 
97 Alan G. Munro to Arthur Anthony Duff, 13 November 1978, FCO 31/2375/39, TNA. 
98 FCO to Peter J. S. Moon, 10 November 1978, FCO 31/2375/35, TNA. 
99 Peter J. S. Moon to FCO, 11 November 1978, FCO 31/2375/37, TNA. 
100 John A. Robson to Derek M. Day, 9 February 1979, FCO 31/2675/11, TNA. 
101 Uganda/Tanzania: Considerations for UK policy, 7 November 1978, FCO 31/2390/65, TNA. 
102 Uganda/Tanzania: Considerations for UK policy, 7 November 1978, FCO 31/2390/65, TNA. 
103 C. T. Hart to Francis X. Gallagher, 13 November 1978, FCO 31/2400/117, TNA. 
33 
 
Although the British officials feared that Amin’s fall would unleash ‘a period of anarchy 
and bloodshed’104 in Uganda and were unable to predict who his successor would be,105 they 
were optimistic about the future prospects of Anglo-Ugandan relations: ‘we would welcome 
Amin's downfall and believe we might be able to work with a successor regime.’106 If this 
seemed to be the case, 107 the FCO officials hoped that early recognition, combined with 
generous amounts of aid, would lead the new Ugandan regime to depend on Britain, thus 
granting it considerable influence. 108 
 In addition to the obvious benefits of Amin’s replacement by a pro-British regime, the 
FCO officials believed that his overthrow might facilitate a warmer and more stable political 
climate in Central East Africa, which would be beneficial to British influence there, as Amin’s 
survival ensured continued animosity between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. His frequent 
threats to his neighbours also caused a regional arms build-up, negating much of Britain’s aid 
effort and potentially leading Tanzania and Kenya to ‘succumb to military rule, a danger which 
will be imminent if Tanzania’s army is defeated and which may come closer in Kenya as its 
now small army is expanded and the new government treads on Kikuyu toes.’109 Therefore, 
assisting Tanzania in its military campaign to repel the Ugandan invasion was consistent with 
Britain’s interests. 
The second goal the officials hoped to achieve through British intervention in the 
Uganda-Tanzania War was to increase influence over Tanzania’s President, Julius Nyerere, in 
order to solve the Rhodesia crisis. The resolution of the Rhodesia crisis was Britain’s main 
African priority, as it represented a continuous source of international embarrassment and 
accusations of British imperialism from African and other developing countries. The officials 
hoped that British intervention in favour of Tanzania might convince President Nyerere – 
notoriously suspicious of Britain’s ‘imperialist’ policy in Africa – that Britain’s intentions were 
benign and that he should continue to support the Anglo-American mediation attempt. Britain 
                                                 
104 David Owen to Certain missions and dependent territories, 3 November 1978, FCO 31/2398/62, TNA. 
105 C. T. Hart to Peter E. Rosling, 30 October 1978, FCO 31/2389/41, TNA. 
106 Uganda/Tanzania: Considerations for UK policy, 7 November 1978, FCO 31/2390/65, TNA. 
107 John A. Robson to Derek M. Day, 13 March 1979, FCO 31/2682/113, TNA. 
108 K. D. Temple to FCO, 1 November 1978, FCO 31/2389/58, TNA. 
109 C. T. Hart to Francis X. Gallagher, 13 November 1978, FCO 31/2400/117, TNA. The comment about 
Kenya’s new government ‘treading on Kikuyu toes’ is a reference to the importance of ethnicity in Kenyan 
politics and its inherent potential for political instability. Kenya’s first President, Jomo Kenyatta, had been a 
member of Kenya’s largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, and had concentrated much power in Kikuyu hands. It 
was expected that Kenya’s new President, Daniel arap Moi – himself a member of the Kalenjin ethnic group 
– would now strip the Kikuyu of some of this power and transfer it to other ethnic groups in order to tame his 
rivals and secure his own position. See Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between hope and despair, 1963-2011. 
London 2011: 138-142. 
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had reason to believe that Nyerere had lost faith in this project,110 and believed a mediated 
settlement would be impossible if he did not convince the Soviet-backed guerrilla movements 
to participate in negotiations. If such a settlement could not be reached, the liberation 
movements would eventually overthrow the Rhodesian minority government, hurting British 
citizens and robbing the West of what little influence they might have left in this resource-rich 
territory. David Owen also confirmed that Britain’s interest in Tanzania was mostly related to 
the conflict in Southern Africa: ‘Certainly, while we have Rhodesia, Tanzania is important – 
and while Nyerere is President. But longer term we should be careful about its significance in 
Africa.’111  
The British officials were wary that a refusal to help Tanzania in its fight against Uganda 
might confirm Nyerere’s suspicions of Britain, leading him to ‘turn eastward and follow more 
extreme politics in Southern Africa than he now does.’112 Therefore, they concluded that ‘[o]ur 
need for good relations with Tanzania, not least in the context of Southern Africa, make it 
essential we do not lose Nyerere's confidence over this affair and do what we can to help 
him.’113 Helping Tanzania might win Britain ‘some political credit, which might be worth 
having for the future. If we do not, we shall lose ground politically, even allowing for a certain 
inevitable element of blackmail in the initial reaction of the Prime Minister and President.’114 
In order to win such credit for use in the Rhodesia conflict, they therefore set out to ‘demonstrate 
to the maximum extent possible our support for Tanzania.’115 
But convincing Nyerere of Britain’s friendship would not be easy. Anglo-Tanzanian 
relations were cool and Britain struggled to convince Nyerere that the Anglo-American 
mediation project was a genuine effort to achieve black majority rule. Nyerere’s difficult and 
suspicious nature meant that there were clear limitations to the results British support for 
Tanzania in the Uganda-Tanzania War could achieve: ‘I just do not think we can ever, by our 
support, create a situation in which he really feels he owes us something. Whatever we do he 
                                                 
110 Alan G. Munro to Philip R. A. Mansfield, 21 November 1978, FCO 31/2376/88, TNA. Nyerere subsequently 
confirmed this in a letter to Callaghan on 5 December 1978: ‘It would be idle to pretend that the events of the 
last seven months have done anything except reduce the chances of the Anglo-American proposals being 
implemented. Yet even so, if there was a minimum chance of success we in Tanzania would once again be 
willing to urge the Patriotic Front leaders to participate in an all parties meeting to that end. Unfortunately I 
do not myself believe that the minimum chance at present exists.’ For the full text of Nyerere’s letter to the 
Prime Minister about Rhodesia, see: Peter J. S. Moon to FCO, 5 December 1978, FCO 31/2643/w14, TNA. 
111 J. Stephen Wall to Ted Rowlands, 29 January 1979, FCO 31/2643/46, TNA. 
112 C. T. Hart to Francis X. Gallagher, 13 November 1978, FCO 31/2400/117, TNA. 
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will see it as having been done for some interest of our own.’116 Therefore, the officials deemed 
that any result from successful support of Tanzania in the Uganda-Tanzania War would be more 
likely to  
 
show itself in the form of averting an increase in his obstruction of our efforts over 
Rhodesia and other issues, than of enlisting his positive backing. A rebuff could increase 
President Nyerere’s suspicions and earn us his animosity. At minimum therefore we should 
try to get into a position where we can at least argue to him that we are being as helpful as 
we can.117 
 
There would be no point, then, in going too far in their assistance to Tanzania. But Nyerere’s 
suspicion towards Britain and his statements saying that the Uganda-Tanzania War was created 
by ‘imperialists’ who wanted to divert attention away from the conflicts in Southern Africa, 
convinced them that they would have to offer Tanzania something. Otherwise, they feared that 
Nyerere could start ‘thinking or saying that our failure to help liquidate the Ugandan incursion 
is deliberately intended to prolong the diversion.’118 Therefore, ‘we should not want any failure 
on our part to respond reasonably helpfully to Tanzanian requests to work, or give the 
appearance of working, to the advantage of Amin.’119 Thus, the officials felt that Britain had to 
intervene in the war, not only because of the potential gains assistance might get them, but 
because of the potential backlash that might follow from a refusal to help. This clearly 
demonstrates the importance that British officials attached both to the Rhodesia conflict and to 
avoiding accusations of imperialism for fear that they might hurt their interests in developing 
countries. 
 The British goals of increased influence in Central East Africa and the resolution of 
Rhodesia were vague and the chances of achieving them through intervention in the Uganda-
Tanzania War were highly uncertain. This made it difficult for the FCO officials to enlist 
support for their policy recommendations outside the FCO. When trying to convince politicians 
from other departments, they therefore tried to bolster their argument by playing up its moral 
aspects:  
                                                 
116 Peter J. S. Moon to John A. N. Graham, 10 November 1978, FCO 31/2369/50, TNA. 
117 Alan G. Munro to Arthur Anthony Duff, 13 November 1978, FCO 31/2375/39, TNA. 
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Tanzania is a fellow Commonwealth country attacked by a much reviled neighbour. She 
had turned to us for help and […] we should be ready in principle to respond in a helpful 
way provided this is not outweighed by disadvantages elsewhere.’120 
 
 Fortunately for the FCO officials, the international moral consensus on the situation was that 
Tanzania was the victim, and could thus be used to promote the FCO’s preferred policy. They 
argued that ‘[a]s the victim of unprovoked aggression Tanzania is likely to have the support of 
virtually all of African and world opinion’,121 and it would therefore not be morally tight to 
assist it, but Britain would look bad if its refusal to do so was exposed internationally: 
 
Amin is a tyrant who has done terrible things in his own country and has now invaded his 
neighbour. Tanzania is seen by many, in Britain as well as outside, as a relatively model 
African country, of unusual stability, and its leader as an enlightened African statesman. 
Nyerere has appealed for our help, and this will almost certainly become known, probably 
quite soon. Do we wish to be able to say we responded? If Nyerere accuses us publicly of 
having rebuffed him, what will we answer?122 
 
The officials argued that Amin’s breach of the OAU principle of territorial integrity was morally 
wrong and that Britain had a strong interest in seeing it restored. They claimed that Uganda’s 
annexation of Tanzanian territory could spawn new conflicts all over Africa, and that ‘an 
outbreak of territorial disputes would raise tensions and the level of armaments to the detriment 
of trade and economic development. This would not be to our benefit unless we see our role 
primarily as a supplier of arms.’123 Therefore, they argued, intervention was not only in 
Britain’s interest, but morally right: ‘[t]here is really no comparison between Tanzania and 
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Uganda on moral grounds and if moral considerations have any part in our present policies there 
should be no hesitation in pressing for effective action against Amin now.'124 
 
3.3 Restrictions to Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War 
Britain’s weakened position in the international system greatly affected the foreign policy. But 
each foreign policy situation or opportunity also tended to bear with it its own set of limitations 
determining Britain’s policy options. This was true of the Uganda-Tanzania War, and it is the 
purpose of this subchapter to present the situation-specific limitations restricting Britain’s 
policy on the conflict. It argues that these limitations meant that Britain’s policy on the Uganda-
Tanzania War would ideally conform to four criteria: it had to be secret, cheap, non-lethal, and 
reactive. 
Secrecy was perhaps the most crucial criterion. Britain’s lack of representation or a 
protecting power in Uganda meant that it could not protect the 3-400 British citizens living 
there against Amin’s vengeance should he learn of Britain’s wartime assistance to Tanzania. 125 
But the FCO officials did not feel that the safety of the British community was a sufficient 
reason for Britain to not to pursue its interests. In fact, Owen seemed unwilling to take 
responsibility for the safety of the British citizens as ‘the community have been warned on 
several occasions of the risks they run by remaining in Uganda’:126  
 
I do not think that we should be deterred from taking action […] for fear of retaliation 
against the British community in Uganda, which still numbers some 4-500 despite the many 
warnings they have been given that they remain there at their own risk.127 
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 In fact, the FCO officials believed that the British community would be in even greater 
danger if Britain achieved its goal of seeing Amin overthrown, as they assumed that ‘a period 
of anarchy and bloodshed’128 would follow his fall: 
 
A military defeat or repulse could precipitate the downfall of Amin. This could lead to a 
general breakdown of law and order and again place the British community, together with 
other expatriates in Uganda, at some risk. But on the likely assumption that Amin's 
successor would mark an improvement, on balance a change of régime in Uganda would 
be to our advantage.’129 
 
Their decision to intervene in the war despite the risk to the British community demonstrates 
that Britain valued overthrow and replacement of the Amin regime over the safety of their own 
citizens. But in order to protect them Britain would have to keep its intervention secret. 
Another strong argument for secrecy was Britain’s fear of accusations of imperialist 
intervention in Africa. The FCO officials felt that African countries wilfully misunderstood 
Britain’s intentions and that ‘[i]t is an article of faith that all the ills of Africa are the fault of 
imperialism.’130 The Uganda-Tanzania War was no exception, and both African and communist 
countries blamed the West for the conflict, calling it ‘a manifestation of imperialist attempts to 
divert attention from Southern African questions by provoking de-stabilisation elsewhere in 
Africa, in this case Tanzania. Alternatively it is suggested […] that the aim is to destroy the 
nationalist movements by depriving them of bases in sympathetic African countries.’131 The 
FCO took these accusations so seriously that they issued a guidance telegram to its missions 
abroad explaining that these allegations were false and that they should be refuted by 
emphasising Britain’s cooperation with the South African nationalist movements and 
embarrassing the Soviet Union by pointing out that they had armed both sides in the Uganda-
Tanzania War, just like in the Ethio-Somali War the year before. The fact that Britain felt it 
necessary to tell its own embassies that it was not imperialist and how to counter such claims 
demonstrates the extreme importance Britain attached to avoiding such allegations. The British 
officials thought there was ‘considerable danger that we shall be cast in the role of the villain’,132 
and could not be seen intervening in an inter-African war for their own purposes while the OAU 
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and African countries were trying to mediate. Therefore, they decided that Britain should 
publicly support such African solutions to the conflict, while intervening covertly: ‘in any 
support for Tanzania we want to avoid laying ourselves open to the charge of foreign 
involvement in an African dispute’.133 
 The officials also feared that open British assistance to Tanzania ‘could facilitate Amin's 
efforts to gain support’; 134 he had so far been unable to attract assistance for his campaign from 
friendly Arab countries, but both Britain and Tanzania believed that overt British assistance for 
Tanzania could have this effect. 135 Britain also wanted their intervention kept secret in order 
‘to avoid giving an opening for Soviet or Cuban intervention and the introduction of an east-
west dimension.’136 Therefore, both parties wanted to keep Britain’s assistance to Tanzania 
secret.137  
 Britain’s decision to keep its assistance to Tanzania secret also served to protect its 
general policy on military assistance and disputes in Africa. They believed that their reaction 
to Tanzania’s requests for assistance – if it became known – could have implications for this 
policy:  
How we respond here will have overtones for other African states who look to us for 
military help and equipment […] Our current policies consist in a) giving our backing to 
African (OAU) efforts to settle disputes peacefully; b) to help through economic and 
military assistance […] to equip African countries close to us to maintain stable 
government and their security. […] In brief we seek to help African states to stand on their 
own feet; in the military field this involves help in preparing them to meet potential threats, 
through a combination of advice and the provision of equipment, training, mainly on 
commercial terms, designed to avoid their coming to us for direct help in an emergency. 
We are not in a position nor do we seek to operate a fire brigade in inter-African disputes; 
these are for Africans to settle.138 
 
British officials feared that open assistance to Tanzania could set an unfortunate precedent 
leading to an increased number of requests from African countries who would expect the same 
level of assistance that Tanzania had received. This was especially true for Kenya in light of 
the Bamburi Understanding. But since Britain wanted to intervene in the conflict, it was decided 
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that the intervention should be covert in order to avoid having to ‘operate a fire brigade’ in 
Africa. 
 In addition to being secret, Britain’s policy had to be cheap. Britain’s poor economic 
performance meant that there was little extra money for ventures such as intervention in the 
Uganda-Tanzania War, and the FCO would have to pay for any assistance to Tanzania 
themselves. As the FCO had just promised massive assistance to Zambia, 139 leaving the FCO 
with very little funds available for intervention in the Uganda-Tanzania War. 140 Tanzania had 
used up its British credit for 1978, 141 and as it now had economic problems of its own, the 
Treasury and Department of Trade was unlikely to approve additional credit. 142 
 The combination of economic problems and uncertainty about the outcome of British 
intervention in the Tanzania-Uganda War meant that the FCO had trouble convincing 
politicians and other departments that Britain should take this chance. The FCO officials were 
very eager to intervene, but although Owen went along with their policies other Ministers were 
not as easily convinced. This meant that cheaper and less risky options were more likely to be 
approved than more costly policies. In fact, the FCO’s best chance of assisting Tanzania was to 
develop policies that didn’t cost money at all, and therefore didn’t require the approval of these 
politicians. 
 Another criterion for Britain’s policy was that the assistance it offered should be non-
lethal. Although not established from the start of the conflict, this became increasingly clear as 
the FCO struggled to develop a policy on the conflict. There were several practical problems 
with weapons supply: Britain’s assistance to Zambia had depleted its stocks of weapons suitable 
for African wars;143 the relative expensiveness of weapons compared with non-lethal equipment 
was problematic; and lethal equipment would have to be declared when seeking overflight 
clearance for transport, making rejections more likely and exposing British military assistance 
to Tanzania. Tanzania’s traditional defence cooperation with communist countries – especially 
China – was also a hindrance as there was no infrastructure for British weapon supply to 
Tanzania and Tanzanian soldiers were unfamiliar with British equipment. 
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 But the strained Anglo-Tanzanian relationship was also a limitation on Britain’s 
willingness to provide weapons. The British officials did not trust Tanzania not to pass weapons 
on to Britain’s enemies, namely the Rhodesian guerrillas and the communist countries. 
Therefore, supply of Blowpipe anti-aircraft weapons was refused on security grounds: 
   
It is an ideal weapon for terrorists/guerrillas. It only needs one Rhodesian aircraft to be shot 
down near the Tanzanian border for us to be accused of arming terrorists waging war 
against HM subjects in Rhodesia, etc. No doubt the Tanzanian government is able to 
prevent Blowpipe falling into terrorist hands; can we be sure they would in all 
circumstances be willing to act in this way?144  
 
Tanzania was also denied offensive mine detecting equipment145 because it was to be standard 
NATO equipment well into the 1980s and the officials feared 
 
that from careful monitoring of the performance of the equipment, a potentially hostile 
power could drastically enhance the efficiency of its mine laying tactics. For our part we 
do not feel able to provide an assurance that the Tanzanians could and would prevent such 
equipment falling into eg Russian hands.146 
 
Therefore, Tanzania’s orders for mine detecting equipment and Blowpipe were refused, 
although the official reason given to the Tanzanians was that no orders were accepted due to 
overly long delivery lead times. The concern that Tanzania might pass weapons on to the 
Rhodesian guerrilla movements might also open Britain to accusations of arming these soldiers: 
 
I do not think President Nyerere would let much stand in his way if he decided that certain 
items of equipment belonging to his own forces were likely to be of decisive help to the 
guerrilla movements which he favours. […] But it is likely that any equipment the 
Tanzanians decided to pass on would be lightweight and of a kind the provenance of which 
might be denied.147 
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So although the British officials did not want to be supplying the Rhodesian guerrillas, the most 
important thing was still that Britain was not caught doing it. 
 Britain’s close relationship with Kenya also restricted the assistance it could offer 
Tanzania. The officials worried that the Kenyans would be angry if they discovered that Britain 
gave Tanzania military assistance, as they might ‘question why we sell them vast amounts of 
equipment but give the Tanzanians a handout.’148 Kenya’s dislike of Tanzania could mean that 
‘once the Kenyans got to hear of the supply of guns, as they would in due course through the 
Parliamentary announcement […] they would raise objection, with a risk to our close military 
relationship.149 Britain were not inclined to risk their relationship with the Kenyans, and they 
were also concerned that military assistance for Tanzania against the Ugandan invasion would 
lead the Kenyans to expect similar treatment if threatened by Somali irredentists. 150 The 
Kenyans also disapproved strongly of Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda, as they feared ‘that a 
continuation of the conflict could lead to a weakening of Amin’s position, resulting in his 
overthrow and a change in Uganda’s foreign policy’ and ‘destroy the balance of power between 
Nairobi, Kampala and Dar-es-Salaam to Kenya’s disadvantage.’ 151 Therefore, the British 
officials were careful not to offer the Tanzanians anything that could endanger their interests in 
Kenya. 
 Britain’s policy was also reactive. This reactiveness was partly a result of the fact that 
Britain had very little reliable information about the conflict on which to act. As Britain had no 
contact with the Ugandan regime and learned very little about the Tanzanians’ intentions, the 
pursuit of an active and confident policy was difficult. The reactiveness was also caused by the 
fact that Britain was not a dominant actor in the situation. Britain’s reduced influence in Africa 
after decolonisation left it little ability to influence events, as military intervention was not an 
option. Nor would it be productive to attempt to bully the warring parties into doing what Britain 
wanted, and its wish not to irritate any of the parties meant that reacting to events as they 
occurred was probably better than trying to dominate the situation. Therefore, Britain’s policy 
was not an active and dominant policy, but rather a more defensive one of reacting to a series 
of Tanzanian demands and requests, hoping to seem helpful to them without compromising 
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Britain’s other interests. The degree to which Britain deferred to African demands and wishes 
in this conflict is really quite surprising, and demonstrates their extreme anxiousness not to be 
accused of imperialist behaviour and lose favour with African countries. 
 
3.4 Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War 
The FCO officials were convinced that Britain’s interests were best served by active support 
for Tanzania in the Uganda-Tanzania War, but to do so would harm Britain’s wider African 
interests. Therefore, the officials developed a two-pronged policy on the Uganda-Tanzania 
War: one official policy to be presented to the public, and one actual policy to be pursued in 
secret. The official policy was designed to give the impression that Britain had no intention of 
intervening in the conflict, instead leaving it for African mediators to settle in a quick and 
peaceful manner; but although it might have been practical for Britain if mediation by the OAU 
or an African state could settle the conflict, it had no faith that this was possible. Britain’s 
profession of support for the conflict to be solved in an ‘African context’ was therefore largely 
lip service – something it had to say in order to show respect for Africa’s right and ability to 
solve its own problem even though this was highly unlikely. Nor would Britain’s goals in the 
Uganda-Tanzania War, namely increased influence in Central East Africa and the resolution of 
the Rhodesia crisis, be achieved if Britain actually adhered to its officially stated policy. Britain 
needed the opportunity to demonstrate support for Tanzania when it was threatened and wanted 
Amin weakened or overthrown by a military defeat if possible.  
Britain’s actual policy was therefore quite the opposite of its official one – a policy of 
active intervention in favour of Tanzania, aimed at impeding Uganda’s military campaign and 
facilitating Tanzania’s. Britain did not strive for a quick and peaceful solution – in fact, it 
enabled Tanzania to avoid mediation and prolong its military campaign against Uganda. This 
policy of secret support for Tanzania remained constant throughout the war, even as Tanzania 
invaded Uganda in January 1979. 
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Chapter 4 
Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War (9 October 1978-22 January 1979) 
 
Perhaps having convinced himself of a Tanzanian hand in the trouble, and perhaps also 
with a cunning view to rallying his own forces, Amin went on to occupy the whole of the 
salient down to the Kagera river by early November. Throwing prudence to the winds and 
in defiance of the almost sacred OAU principle of territorial integrity, he announced its 
annexation.152 
 
Uganda’s invasion of Tanzania in October 1978 triggered not only the Uganda-Tanzania War, 
but a renewed British interest in Central East Africa. British influence in the region had been 
waning since independence, and the FCO officials saw the outbreak of the Uganda-Tanzania 
War as a desirable opportunity for Britain to regain some of its former influence in the region. 
The officials immediately set out to find a way to support Tanzania’s campaign to repulse the 
Ugandan invasion, and developed several suggestions for how this may be done in the few days 
between the outbreak of war and Tanzania’s first request for assistance. 
 Britain’s support for Tanzania was most intense during the two-week Ugandan invasion, 
and waned immediately when the Ugandans announced their withdrawal. This demonstrates 
that the officials’ primary goal with offering material assistance was in fact to ensure Uganda’s 
military defeat, in the hopes that this would not only impress Tanzania, but ideally result in 
Amin’s fall. When Uganda announced the withdrawal of its army from Tanzania, both the 
immediate need for British assistance to Tanzania and the opportunity to unseat Amin seemed 
to have passed.  
 Although the FCO officials were able to provide Tanzania with some assistance in phase 
one, it was unable to get approval for most of its policy suggestions. Politicians and officials 
outside the FCO were unwilling to prioritise the Uganda-Tanzania War, and in the end the FCO 
could only get approval for assistance that was free or for which it would bear the cost. As the 
FCO had recently spent most of its funds on assistance to Zambia and its stocks were depleted, 
it had little material support to offer Tanzania. After the invasion was over, Britain offered 
Tanzania some military and economic support in the form of a modest amount of equipment, 
expedited commercial orders, £4 million credit extension and £3.5 million in aid. The FCO paid 
for the equipment that was given to Tanzania, and barely got the credit extension approved by 
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the other ministries. It was fortunate that the Ministry of Overseas Development was willing to 
approve additional aid for Tanzania, or the FCO’s policy might have failed. The officials were 
concerned that Tanzania would simply turn the offer down if it was insufficient in order to avoid 
a public announcement revealing that they had asked Britain for help. 
 In addition to material and economic support, Britain tried to assist Tanzania by 
restricting Amin’s oil supply in the hopes that this would make it impossible for him to continue 
his invasion of Tanzania. Britain was able to pressure the British oil companies to restrict 
supplies to Uganda, but was unsuccessful in its attempts to encourage other governments to do 
the same. After Uganda’s withdrawal from Tanzania Britain was no longer willing to pressure 
its oil companies or intervene with other countries, but helped by Uganda’s deteriorating 
economy and reduced access to crude oil because of the Iranian revolution, Uganda was unable 
to increase its oil intake even after British pressure for oil reduction waned. 
 The officials were very pleased with the results of this modest policy. Tanzania was 
very happy with the assistance Britain had offered, and the Anglo-Tanzanian relationship was 
significantly warmer by the end of phase one than it had been at the start of the war. Amin 
remained President of Uganda, but as his fall had in any event been a highly uncertain 
possibility, the British officials were satisfied that they had increased British influence in 
Tanzania. 
  
4.1 Britain and the Ugandan invasion 
Britain observed the escalating fighting on the Uganda-Tanzania border with growing concern, 
but did not initially intend to intervene. This changed on 31 October 1978, when Britain learned 
that Uganda had invaded Tanzania the day before. The FCO officials recognised the conflict as 
an opportunity to increase British influence in Africa, and immediately set about finding ways 
of supporting Tanzania’s campaign to fight back the Ugandan invasion. 
 
4.1.1 Britain’s assistance to Tanzania 
Although Tanzania made no request for assistance when briefing Britain about the invasion 
on 31 October, the EAD was very enthusiastic about the opportunity to intervene in the 
Uganda-Tanzania War. The officials convinced David Owen to recommend to the Prime 
Minister that a general offer of assistance be made to Tanzania a mere hours after learning of 
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the invasion, as they judged the Ugandan invasion to be ‘an important psychological moment 
in our relations with Nyerere and should like to give a swift demonstration of our readiness to 
help.’153 Owen admitted that stock depletion and Tanzania’s traditional defence relationship 
meant that there was in fact little equipment Britain could offer, but still believed it to be ‘in 
our political interests to respond to President Nyerere’s approach by indicating our 
willingness to help within practical limits’.154 This suggestion was rejected by the Prime 
Minister, the Defence Secretary Fred Mulley and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis 
Healey, who believed that ‘an offer of military equipment to President Nyerere at this stage 
would be premature and possibly damaging’,155 and that Britain ‘should be careful not to give 
President Nyerere an opening to put in requests which, in the event, we might not be able to 
honour.156 
 But this rejection did not deter the EAD officials, who immediately set about finding 
another way to assist Tanzania. When they discovered that Tanzania had 36 Scorpion tanks on 
order in Britain, and that the first consignment of four was about to be sent by sea the 
following week, they suggested offering to airfreight the tanks to Nyerere as this ‘could make 
a practical contribution to his defence forces and would show our concern to help him.157 
Despite their discovery that this was an impractical idea because no ammunition was available 
and the Tanzanian tank drivers were still undergoing training in Britain, the officials thought 
it worthwhile to make the offer – if the Tanzanians turned it down because it was impractical, 
‘that would be for them, and we would have shewn willing.’158 Owen therefore took the 
proposal to the Defence Secretary, who turned it down because it was too impractical.159 
 The Scorpion idea was abandoned on 6 November, when Tanzania made its first 
request for British assistance.160 Several other requests followed throughout November, 
resulting in a list of Tanzanian equipment and weaponry requirements worth £20 million by 
early December.161 The High Commissioner to Tanzania, Peter Moon, believed that ‘if we 
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respond reasonably generously we will win political credit, and we will lose ground 
politically if we do not’,162 and therefore thought Britain should try to respond positively to 
the Tanzanian requests: ‘I do not need to elaborate on the political advantages of doing what 
we can to help. It is clear that the rapid repeat rapid supply of even a few items would be 
enormously appreciated.’163 But the Tanzanian requests were ‘far beyond what we could, or 
indeed might want to, supply rapidly. Cost would run into many millions.’164 Therefore, 
Britain responded to Tanzania on 9 November that it would speed up deliveries of items 
already on order in Britain, and asked how Tanzania intended to pay for the items it 
requested. 
The Tanzanians expressed great shock and disappointment at Britain’s response and 
said it had misunderstood their approach completely – they were not asking for help with 
commercial orders, but for government-to-government assistance, hoping that Britain would 
help with the costs and supply Tanzania from Britain’s own military stocks.165 Tanzania’s 
negative reaction made the officials reconsider their strategy and try to repair Tanzania’s 
disappointment with Britain: 
 
The balance of political argument therefore justifies the production of some direct help, 
even if it is little more than a gesture, in response to the Tanzanian request. [...] In this we 
shall at least hope to ensure our position is defensible and reduce the chances of a hostile 
overreaction.166 
 
Therefore, the officials decided to start working on supplying a ‘modest but still helpful 
package which we would offer to the Tanzanians at no expense to them.’167 This package was 
to consist of some radio equipment, a few detectors, and, if available, a small number of 
assault boats. They also considered offering anti-tank guns if the Tanzanians continued to ask 
for weaponry.168 
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The officials deemed that ‘[a]n offer on the above lines, together with the availability 
of commercially supplied equipment which the Tanzanians have on order from the UK, 
should be sufficient to reassure the Tanzanians that we are being as helpful as we can be 
towards them and thus hold the position at least until the military situation clarifies.’169 The 
officials were willing to go far in order to avoid another negative reaction from Tanzania, and 
even considered ‘whether a message in measured terms from the Prime Minister was desirable 
to try to hold our relations together.’170 Owen recommended to his ministerial colleagues that 
the equipment package be offered to the Tanzanians, but although the Defence Secretary and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed, Callaghan remained unconvinced and asked: ‘If this is to 
be supplied free, what are we to get in return - politically or in some other way? We must not 
be bullied by them’.171 As the officials were eager to get the package approved, they 
immediately started reworking their proposal, but were interrupted by the announcement of 
Uganda’s military withdrawal from Tanzania on 14 November 1978. Any offers of assistance 
to Tanzania were now put on hold until the situation clarified. 172 
The equipment package was the third FCO policy suggestion on the Uganda-Tanzania 
War to be rejected by the ministers. The fact that the officials were able to bring three distinct 
proposals to ministerial level less than two weeks into the Ugandan invasion, demonstrates 
not only their eagerness to come up with ways of assisting Tanzania, but also the relative ease 
with which they convinced Owen to promote their ideas. However, the ministerial rejections 
suggest that the FCO attached excessive importance to the Uganda-Tanzania War, and that 
the top decision-makers were much less willing to prioritise the conflict. This trend was 
obvious throughout the Uganda-Tanzania War whenever costly policy initiatives were 
proposed. 
The assistance offers were not Britain’s only effort to please Tanzania during the 
invasion. In an attempt to avoid Tanzanian irritation with Britain, the FCO officers intervened 
with the editorial content of BBC's radio broadcasts despite their own opinion that ‘their 
reporting is clearly aimed at being fair.’173 The Tanzanians were angered by the BBC’s equal 
presentation of official statements from Uganda and Tanzania, and were suspicious of the 
BBC's motives. Intervention with the editorial practice of Britain’s public-service broadcaster 
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was a drastic move is another example of the FCO’s eagerness to please the Tanzanians and 
to guard against Tanzania’s tendency to view British actions as suspicious and ‘imperialist.’ 
The FCO also discussed bringing the Ugandan invasion to the United Nations, as they 
considered the conflict ‘tailor-made’ for the Security Council and that to take it there would 
be perfectly in line with Britain’s UN policy. 174 UN sanctions against Uganda could also 
relieve pressure on British oil companies and discomfit the Soviet Union as it had armed both 
Uganda and Tanzania. 175 However, this was never seriously considered, as Nyerere wanted 
neither mediation nor UN interference and African countries would be annoyed that the OAU 
were not allowed to resolve the issue.176 Again, Britain deferred to the wishes of African 
countries in order to avoid accusations of imperialism, even when a different policy might 
have been in Britain’s interest. 
The Ugandan invasion had major impact on Britain’s policy of assistance towards 
Tanzania. It was only during the two-week invasion that Britain would consider any offer of 
material assistance, and it was only during this period that it was willing to use its influence 
with other actors such as the BBC or the UN. This tells us that Britain’s willingness to assist 
Tanzania was much greater when it was under attack than otherwise, and also that the 
prospect of inflicting a military defeat on Amin – thus hopefully toppling him – was very 
attractive to Britain. Once the Ugandan withdrawal removed these incentives, Britain’s 
interest in the conflict lessened and it started looking for a way not to offend Tanzania rather 
than provide it with expensive material assistance. 
 
4.1.2 Britain’s attempts to undermine Uganda during the invasion 
As Britain no longer had diplomatic relations with Uganda, their only remaining area of 
official contact was bilateral trade. Britain’s policy had long been to give ‘no active 
encouragement to British trade with Uganda’,177 but this policy was abandoned when Uganda 
invaded Tanzania – Britain now actively discouraged trade with Uganda in the two most 
significant areas of Anglo-Ugandan trade: petroleum and luxury goods. 
 The Ugandan invasion made the restriction of Uganda’s oil supplies a crucial part of 
Britain’s policy. The officials believed that the combination of Uganda’s poor economic 
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performance, the escalating unrest and a reduction in oil supply could cause economic 
collapse in Uganda, and that this could potentially lead to Amin’s overthrow.178 Alternatively, 
reduced oil supply could lead to Amin’s overthrow through military defeat, as oil supply was 
considered a ‘critical factor in Amin’s ability to sustain a campaign’.179 An additional 
incentive was Tanzania’s request on 2 November 1978 that Britain should stop its oil 
companies from supplying oil to Uganda while it was invading Tanzania. Uganda’s oil supply 
had ‘become a key issue in Nyerere’s mind for the moment. He sees a cut off of oil as the one 
way of ensuring a rapid and succesful [sic] conclusion to the affair.’180 Nyerere also told the 
American Ambassador that ‘the single thing he wanted most of all was for the British to cut 
off oil.’181 Thus, the Ugandan invasion made the British officials very eager to ensure that 
Uganda’s oil supply was restricted, although they were wary that too obvious obstruction of 
Uganda’s oil supply would be interpreted as an obvious ‘politically-inspired attempt to bring 
down the Amin regime.’182  
 Because the United States had imposed a unilateral trade embargo on Uganda in 
October 1978, Britain was already in contact with the British oil companies Shell and British 
Petroleum (BP) about oil supply for Uganda.183 When the American oil companies withdrew 
from Uganda its oil supply fell by 40%, and as the British oil company Shell/BP (Uganda) 
Limited was now the largest actor in the Ugandan oil market with its 40% market share, the 
officials expected Uganda to pressure it to increase supplies.184 The FCO officials had 
therefore held a meeting with the oil companies on 26 October, expressing their fears that an 
increase ‘would be likely to arouse substantial public and parliamentary criticism and could 
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be used as a lever by those who would like the UK to follow the US example and introduce an 
embargo against Uganda.’185 The oil companies had explained that their supply to Uganda 
was currently reduced by 30% due to Ugandan payment arrears, and proposed to keep supply 
at this reduced level. The companies would blame the Ugandan debts and reduced access to 
crude oil because of the crisis in Iran, although they expressed concern that this position 
might not be tenable for long.186 The officials were pleased with this policy, which they 
thought ‘coincides admirably with government interests.’187 
 But the Ugandan invasion changed Britain’s policy on oil to Uganda, and the FCO 
officials called another meeting with the oil companies on 1 November 1978. The officials 
now told Shell and BP that the Ugandan invasion meant that ‘[t]he importance of British 
companies avoiding infilling the US market share would now be more acute and we hoped 
that BP and Shell would drag their feet to the maximum extent possible in response to 
Ugandan requests for more oil.’ 188 Although the oil companies claimed to have no intention 
of increasing supply, they wanted to reserve the possibility in case their local staff came under 
threat; they thought that as ‘Amin could now be in a difficult situation internally he might be 
more inclined to rely on threats to achieve the fuel he urgently needed.’189 The FCO officials 
told the oil company representatives that they did not want them to increase supplies, 
threatening that although at present ‘there was no question of the Government instructing oil 
companies to cease supply […] the eventuality could not be totally ruled out.’190 They made it 
clear that the oil companies would lose the government’s support if they allowed the safety of 
their local staff to trump Britain’s desire to see oil supplies kept low: 
 
[W]hereas the oil companies would certainly have public and Government support if they 
pursued their present intention of restricting supply to current levels, it would be much 
more difficult to offer such support if the companies, for whatever reasons, felt obliged to 
increase supplies. 191 
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They made clear that any increase in oil supply to Uganda could lead the oil companies to 
come under open criticism from the British government or to be ordered to stop supply; in 
fact, the officials confirmed that they would prefer that Shell and BP withdraw from Uganda 
altogether than increase it. 192 Faced with these arguments the oil companies agreed to keep 
supply at the recent reduced levels, which they did throughout the Uganda-Tanzania War.193  
But the government officials did not trust Shell and BP to keep supplies down, and 
certainly expected them ‘to raise strong resistance to a move to suspend supplies altogether, 
on general grounds of commercial policy in Africa, and in view of the risk of retaliation 
against their staff in Uganda. But these points might at some stage have to be faced.’194 
Therefore, David Owen enquired whether the government could stop oil supply without 
imposing a full trade embargo.195 It could not196 and although it could possibly intervene with 
BP on policy grounds, trying to do so could damage their relationship with Shell.197 This idea 
was therefore rejected, but could potentially be revived if Nyerere should ‘bring fresh and 
heavy pressure on us over the restricted oil supply by Shell/BP’.198 
Because Britain could not force Shell and BP to stop supplying Uganda, it sought to 
take pressure off the British oil companies by trying to make other actors restrict the flow of 
oil to Amin. As all Ugandan oil imports went through Kenya, it was the only actor with the 
ability to unilaterally stop all oil supplies to Uganda. Britain made several attempts to find out 
if Kenya would intervene with Uganda’s oil supply, but never pressured it to do so except 
telling Moi that ‘[i]f the Kenya government felt it was desirable to take measures to restrict 
further or to prohibit the transit of POL199 to Uganda this would have our support, certainly as 
far as Shell BP were concerned.’200 But Kenya was adamant that it should remain neutral and 
would therefore neither suspend Uganda’s oil supplies nor pressure the oil companies to 
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supply more.201 As the British officials did not want to risk Britain’s excellent relationship 
with Kenya by pressing this issue, they decided to look for other ways to limit oil supplies. 
As Britain could not stop British oil companies from supplying Uganda and Kenya 
was unwilling to do so, the officials concluded that ‘our best course is to do all we can to 
discourage all the oil companies concerned in supply to Uganda, including the Italian and 
French, from infilling the suspended American share or increasing their supply above current, 
reduced, levels.’202 They calculated that if all three remaining all companies kept supplies 
down to recent reduced levels, ‘Uganda will only get 40% of normal supply – a severe 
restraint.’203 The British officials believed that ‘[a]ny increase in supplies from Agip and 
Total must help ease Amin’s position and could influence his ability to resist a Tanzanian 
counter-attack in the Kagera salient.’204 It also put Shell/BP and Britain in a more exposed 
position in Uganda, as increases from the two other companies would make it seem like 
Shell/BP was simply refusing to increase supplies because it didn’t want to. It also put them in 
an awkward position with the Tanzanians, whom they believed ‘however unfairly, may blame 
Shell/BP and the British Government for continuing to supply oil to Amin. Clearly we must 
do what we can to preclude this possibility.’205 
Britain therefore decided to ask Italy and France to intervene with Total and Agip to 
get them to keep supplies down to the same levels as Shell/BP,206 and asked the United States 
to make the same request to them.207 France, which had a stable relationship with Amin and 
disliked Nyerere, responded that it would treat the question of oil supply to Uganda as a 
purely commercial question – it had no desire to intervene in an African conflict and would 
not ask Total to limit supplies.208 The Italians had no intention of intervening either, but 
admitted that the Ugandan invasion created special circumstances and ‘that there might now 
be a case for urging restraint on Agip if the Tanzanians were to ask the Italian government to 
do so.’209 Britain therefore told Tanzania that it might want to approach Italy and France 
about the oil issue, as it was pointless to only pressure for a British reduction of supply: 
‘[e]ven if we had power to meet the Tanzanian request for a complete cut-off of supply to 
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Uganda by Shell/BP, such action would be rendered pointless if Agip and Total increased 
supplies to make up the difference.’210 Although Tanzania waited until December to approach 
the Italians, they acquiesced and told Agip that they did not want it to increase supply above 
normal levels. 211 
The other important Anglo-Ugandan trade connection was the Stansted flights. The 
FCO officials had tried to ban the flights on several occasions, but had been repeatedly turned 
down by the Secretary of State for Trade, Edmund Dell. The FCO had therefore decided to let 
the issue rest, but the Ugandan invasion provided an opportunity to try again. On 13 
November 1978 Owen therefore renewed his recommendation that the flight be suspended, 
arguing that the Uganda-Tanzania War justified this move:  
 
I believe that Amin's attack on a friendly Commonwealth country, and the internal 
situation in Uganda, have produced a new situation in which the question of action 
against the flights should be reconsidered. We now have reason to believe that stopping 
these flights from Stansted, and with them the flow of luxury items to Amin's military 
supporters, will weaken his authority over his soldiers. They could indeed be tempted to 
turn against him. [...] I believe we should not let slip an opportunity to take action which 
might tip the scales against Amin and that there is a strong case for finding means to 
suspend the flights from Stansted. [...] If action against the flights is to have the impact 
we want, it is important to move swiftly to take advantage of the present unrest.212 
 
The Prime Minister agreed with Owen’s recommendation, 213 but the new Secretary of State 
for Trade, John Smith, wanted a full Cabinet discussion of the issue. 214 However, Uganda 
announced its withdrawal from Tanzania before a conclusion was reached, and the initiative 
simply petered out. Thus, the FCO’s November 1978 attempt to suspend the Stansted flights 
confirm the impression left by its oil policy: the Ugandan invasion allowed the officials to 
pursue more extreme policies than they would otherwise have done, but once the invasion was 
over they reverted to normal policy. 
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4.2 Britain and the Ugandan withdrawal 
4.2.1 Britain’s assistance to Tanzania after the Ugandan withdrawal 
The Tanzanians refused to admit that a withdrawal was taking place, and continued to make 
assistance requests of Britain throughout phase one.215 As Britain soon came to believe that 
the Ugandan withdrawal was genuine, David Owen recommended to the Prime Minister that 
direct assistance for Tanzania now be abandoned altogether in favour of humanitarian aid and 
expediting Tanzanian orders for defence equipment in Britain.216 In order to avoid a blank 
refusal of Tanzania’s numerous requests for material assistance, Britain offered it a gift of ten 
mine detectors to be used in the rehabilitation of the Kagera salient, 217 and free airfreight of a 
bridge for civilian use. 218 The officials also sought to find out if any of Tanzania’s other 
requirements could be delivered on commercial terms or as part of Britain’s rehabilitation to 
Tanzania.219 
 Any new Tanzanian commercial orders would require an increase in credit from the 
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), as Tanzania had already maxed out its credit 
for 1978. ‘The Tanzanians have given us a large shopping list worth over £20 m. They are 
prepared to pay if we can provide ECGD-backed credit. Credit of this order is out of the 
question. But it is very much in our political interest to go some way to meet Tanzania’s 
request and enable her to place some orders in UK.’220 When the equipment that could not be 
provided on delivery or security grounds was excluded from the list along with ammunition –  
for which credit was never offered221 – the Tanzanian requests would only cost about £4 
million. However, a £4 million credit increase would demand approval from the Department 
of Trade and the Treasury, and was unlikely because Tanzania was experiencing economic 
problems. Therefore, on 4 December 1978, Owen pressed hard for the other Ministers’ 
approval for a credit increase, arguing that such an extension was in Britain’s national 
interest:222 
 
We need President Nyerere's goodwill over various southern African problems not least 
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Rhodesia and Namibia. On the whole he has played a constructive role on these issues. 
However, he is disappointed in our ability to supply equipment on a government-to-
government basis. If we now have to indicate to him that we are unable to provide the 
small amount of additional credit cover needed to meet relatively modest supplies of 
commercially ordered, non-lethal, equipment I fear that he will be reinforced in his 
suspicions of us as a friend. […] Our national interest in being prepared to help Tanzania 
to the extent I am now proposing is clear.223 
 
Both the Chancellor of the Exchequer224 and the Secretary of State for trade were reluctant to 
approve a credit increase, but agreed because ‘the contract amount you have in mind is fairly 
modest and […] there is a wider view of the national interest to be taken into account.’ 225 The 
Prime Minister also agreed. 226 This was the first time the FCO succeeded in getting a costly 
policy measure on the Uganda-Tanzania War approved by ministers from other departments. 
That the ministers would grudgingly accept assistance to Tanzania only when it did not 
constitute an outright gift and when arguments of British national interests were invoked, 
clearly demonstrates their continued reluctance to make the Uganda-Tanzania War a priority.  
 Britain had proclaimed their willingness to offer Tanzania humanitarian aid on several 
occasions during phase one, and when the Ugandan invasion was over the officials tried to 
ensure that it would be forthcoming. Fortunately, the Minister for Overseas Development, 
Judith Hart, approved a planned programme aid grant of £2.5 million for Tanzania in late 
November, of which an unallocated portion of £250,000 could be used for rehabilitation in the 
Kagera salient if the Tanzanians so wished. Hart stated that ‘[w]hile this offer has no direct 
bearing on the hostilities in North West Tanzania and has been under consideration for some 
time, we hope that the timing of this offer will be helpful in relation to current exchanges with 
the Tanzanians.’227 This offer was presented to the Tanzanians as part of Britain’s 
rehabilitation assistance in connection with the Uganda-Tanzania War. In response to 
continued Tanzanian requests – for instance for a £1 million floating bridge – the FCO asked 
Hart if she would agree to pay for 50 trucks Tanzania had on order in Britain, a total cost of 
£760,000.228 As this offer – like so many other FCO policy suggestions regarding the Uganda-
Tanzania War – turned out to be impractical, Hart asked Owen of he ‘would agree, therefore, 
that it might be preferable to offer a sum – say £1 million – of programme aid to the 
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Tanzanians, for use for civilian rehabilitation in the Kagera area. They could order additional 
equipment with this, or use it to pay for goods already ordered.’229 It was very fortunate for 
the FCO officials that the Ministry of Overseas Development was willing to prioritise aid for 
Tanzania, as Britain otherwise would have been able to offer the Tanzanians very little 
assistance at all. 
 The last hindrance to Britain’s assistance offer to Tanzania was parliamentary 
announcement of its cost. Before the announcement of a successful assistance offer could be 
made, the Tanzanians had requested that their requests for assistance be kept secret.The 
officials therefore rejected the News Department’s wish to confirm, if pressed, that Britain 
had received assistance requests from Tanzania230 and in response to Parliamenary Questions 
on the issue simply answered that ‘[t]he Tanzanian and British Governments have kept in 
touch about the attack by Uganda. The substance of these exchanges is confidential.’231 But 
the issue of a parliamentary announcement was not straightforward, as the officials feared that 
Tanzania’s obsession with secrecy might lead it to refuse Britain’s offer and ‘rather forego the 
assistance than risk the publicity’:232 
 
Having regard to the emphasis which they have put on secrecy in the past, which has 
originated with the President, I also would not exclude their taking the line that, our 
financial help so far being minimal, they would prefer to pay themselves and have no 
announcement.233  
 
The officials therefore delayed its assistance offer to Tanzania until it was substantial enough 
to ensure Tanzanian acceptance: ‘It would at that stage be clear to them that what was on offer 
was substantial and we would hope worth the risk which they see in publicity. 234 Therefore, 
the total British assistance offer to Tanzania, consisting of ten mine detectors, the airfreight of 
a bridge, £3.5 million in rehabilitation aid, a £4 million increase in ECGD credit and the 
expediting of commercial orders placed with British firms, was made on 28 December 1978 
along with information about the necessity for a parliamentary announcement. Fortunately, 
the Tanzanians accepted both the offer of assistance and – after some hand-holding – the need 
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for a parliamentary announcement. Owen could therefore announce the assistance to 
Parliament on 15 January:  
The British Government have made available to the Government of Tanzania 
programme aid amounting to £1 million, to be used subject to the normal conditions 
attached to such aid, for civilian rehabilitation purposes in the Kagera region. This is 
additional to the £2.5 million of programme aid made available recently for other 
purposes. The British Government have also paid the air freight costs of a girder bridge, 
and have supplied a small amount of mine detecting equipment, to help the rehabilitation 
of the region. A supplementary estimate for the amount involved, which is of the order of 
£81,000, will be laid before Parliament the normal way.235  
 
In accordance with their assurances to the Tanzanians, they emphasised the rehabilitation 
aspect of the aid. Britain now thought both the war and its part in it to be over. 236 
Finally, the development of Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War also tells us 
something about its relationship with Tanzania. If thinking in traditional great power terms, 
one might have expected Britain to be the dominant party in the Anglo-Tanzanian 
relationship. As this chapter has demonstrated, this was clearly not the case. Tanzania’s 
excessive requests to Britain and its open indignation at their rejection indicates that Tanzania 
did not behave like a submissive developing country hoping for great power benevolence. 
Tanzania did not defer to Britain in any way, and allowed it no influence on or insight into 
Tanzanian policy on the conflict. Rather, Britain took the submissive role in the relationship, 
meekly awaiting Tanzania’s requests and trying to avoid rejecting them. It certainly did not 
push Tanzania in any way, for instance towards mediation or a UN approach, opting instead to 
simply wait for Tanzania’s intentions to become clear so that it could react to them. Britain 
could not afford to offend Tanzania, both because it needed Nyerere in Rhodesia and because 
it wanted to avoid suspicions of ‘imperialist’ intentions on its own part. To demonstrate its 
friendship towards Africa and Tanzania, Britain strained to provide Tanzania with assistance; 
oddly, it seems that when it came to the Tanzania-Uganda War, Britain needed Tanzania more 
than Tanzania needed Britain. The fear of the FCO officials that Tanzania might turn down 
any British assistance offer it deemed insufficient confirms this tendency. 
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4.2.2 Britain’s attempts to undermine Uganda after the withdrawal 
After the announcement of Ugandan withdrawal on 14 November the officials were no longer 
willing to threaten Shell and BP to keep supplies down. They reverted to Britain’s pre-
invasion policy of simply discouraging an increase, and would now accept an increase to 
normal levels of supply if the oil companies insisted: 
 
in this situation we should not press the companies too hard. If Total and AGIP have 
increased their supply continued restriction by Shell/BP will no longer have much effect 
in weakening the position of Amin’s regime. But we should ask them not to go above 
their normal planned supply level.237  
 
Fortunately for Britain, the government’s mild discouragement, Uganda’s inability to pay its 
debts and supply problems concerning crude oil from Iran led the oil companies to maintain 
the low supplies agreed with the government throughout the Uganda-Tanzania War. 
 Uganda’s withdrawal also made Britain less willing to intervene with other 
governments to reduce Uganda’s oil supply. Although they continued to monitor the policies 
and supply levels of Agip and Total, the officials were less negative towards an increase from 
Agip or Total when the invasion was over as ‘[p]erhaps oddly enough this will help take the 
heat off Shell.’238 This represented a complete turnaround from their attitude during the 
invasion, when they intervened repeatedly with France and Italy and enlisted the assistance 
off the United States to stop such an increase. 
 
4.3 The results of Britain’s policy on the first phase of the Uganda-Tanzania War 
The British officials were pleased with the results of their policy on the first phase of the 
Uganda-Tanzania War. Britain’s initial offer of £2.5 million programme aid to Tanzania had 
resulted in a very warm personal letter from President Nyerere to Callaghan, 239 and the 
officials were very pleased when reports that Nyerere was speaking kindly about Britain 
started reaching them by late 1978.240 Along with their formal acceptance of Britain’s 
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assistance offer, the Tanzanians had signalled that they wanted to develop a military 
cooperation with Britain.241 It soon became clear that the Tanzanians were thinking of placing 
very large military orders in the UK and wanted a defence attaché in London,242 a 
development welcomed by Owen, who ‘would like to give the Tanzanian request favourable 
consideration.’243 The FCO officials believed that this could be the start of an entirely new 
relationship with Tanzania, and possibly one where she turned away from communist supply: 
‘it seems to me that what is on offer here is little short of a transformation of our relations 
with the Tanzanians in the Defence field and that there are the strongest political arguments 
for giving the most positive possible response.244  
This led the officials to conclude that their policy had been a success: 
 
To take stock of our own position, the response we were able to make, albeit limited in 
the military equipment field, has fully met our objective of avoiding a deterioration in our 
sensitive relationship with President Nyerere. But it has clearly gone further and produced 
a new feeling of warmth and an evident desire for closer relations, including in the 
military arena, on the part of the Tanzanian leadership. This is wholly welcome and could 
help us in the context of other African problems. […]The prospect of a closer military 
relationship with Tanzania now presents itself. Within our means we should do our best 
to foster this.245 
 
Hopefully further cultivation of the Anglo-Tanzanian relationship could lead to renewed 
cooperation over the Rhodesia conflict, 246 as  
 
[t]here is no doubt that as a result of our previous forthcoming attitude on the supply of 
defence equipment, additional credit and rehabilitation assistance we are firmly numbered 
on the side of the angels on an issue of overwhelming importance to Tanzania. We are 
consequently building up credit on which we can if necessary draw in the future.247 
 
On the other hand, Amin did not fall, and Britain was displeased by his survival: ‘[i]t is 
unfortunate and perverse that Amin should have emerged from his action without great 
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damage to his reputation in much of Africa, though the signs of Libyan coolness could prove 
significant.’248 The officials did, however, believe that his power base was eroding: 
 
It is tempting to conclude that 1978 showed that time was running out for Amin. It can be 
argued that his power base has narrowed, he has alienated international, including 
African, opinion still further, and his economy is in ruins. But while his problems are 
undoubtedly accumulating, he has continued to demonstrate his ability to survive. [...] All 
he asks is to stay on top, one jump ahead of his enemies, indulging in the occasional antic 
to attract attention; he is adept at survival. Short of the assassin's bullet, which still seems 
his likeliest end, I suspect my successor in East African Department will have a similar 
prognostication twelve months hence, though I heartily hope not.249 
 
So British influence in Uganda was not much advanced by its policy on the Uganda-Tanzania 
War. 
 On balance, then, the officials deemed that their influence in Tanzania was increasing, 
while Amin’s survival precluded such a development in Uganda. They did, however, feel that 
their assistance offer to Tanzania ‘went down well, and stood in contrast to the negative 
attitude of others whom the Tanzanians approached, notably the Russians.’250 They also 
hoped that their warmer relations and a positive response on defence cooperation with 
Tanzania could mean that reduced Tanzanian dependence on the communist bloc for military 
equipment: 
 
Given Tanzanian importance in the South African context, and the way a close defence 
relationship would strengthen our links in all fields, it is clearly in our political interest to 
provide a favourable response. Even if we cannot meet the Tanzanians all the way we 
must avoid giving them the impression of a rebuff. We have emerged quite well from our 
dealings with the Tanzanians in the wake of the Ugandan aggression; we should not 
dissipate the opportunities this good will has generated for the future. By giving a 
reasonably positive response, we can usefully develop our contacts with senior Tanzanian 
political and military figures, until now somewhat distant, and may thereby lessen 
Tanzanian attachment to the Russians (and Chinese) and foster better understanding of 
the western position in Africa.251 
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They were also very pleased at the fact that Britain succeeded in keeping its intervention in 
the Uganda-Tanzania War secret and avoided damage to its relationship with Kenya. 
Therefore, considering the low cost of the assistance provided and the uncertainties of 
whether Britain might gain something from it, the officials were very pleased with the results 
of their policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War in its first phase. 
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Chapter 5 
Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War (23 January 1979-11 April 1979) 
 
In fact, we know […] that the Tanzanians have penetrated 15-30 miles into Uganda and are 
providing support for Ugandan exiles in a bid to overthrow Amin. We are in some potential 
difficulty over this issue. We condemned the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania, but do not 
want to offend Nyerere, or appear to support Uganda, in the present situation.252 
 
Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda in January 1979 transformed it from victim to aggressor and 
breached OAU principles. This challenged Britain’s policy of support for Tanzania, as it had 
recently condemned Uganda for the same offence and could now face pressure to condemn 
Tanzania. Britain did not want to do so, but nor could they risk open support for Tanzania. 
Therefore, Britain’s policy remained the same as in phase one: covert support for Tanzania. But 
as it now supported the aggressor in the conflict, secrecy became an even more important part 
of Britain’s policy than before. 
 Britain’s initial reflex was to dissociate itself from the conflict to avoid accusations that 
it supported one African state’s attempt to overthrow the government of another. Therefore, it 
was at first wary of any association with Tanzania, even to the extent of refusing to give it 
information. But as the war changed in late February 1979, so did Britain’s willingness to 
become involved, mainly due to three factors: Tanzania’s decision to take Kampala and 
overthrow Amin itself, Libya’s military intervention in the conflict and the increasing amount 
of Tanzanian requests for British intervention. 
 Britain’s intervention in phase two was largely diplomatic. Diplomatic assistance was 
considered cheaper and less conspicuous, but most importantly, it was the easiest way of 
pleasing Tanzania. Britain’s first major policy measure in phase two was the cancellation of the 
Stansted flights. This was done only when it seemed clear that Amin would fall, and because 
the officials thought it would make Britain look better to Tanzania, the new Ugandan 
government and world opinion in general. Britain also intervened with Kenya after strong 
pressure from Tanzania, as they had a shared interest in seeing Kenya stop supplies from 
reaching Uganda and saw it as an opportunity to ensure that Tanzania did not back Obote for 
the Ugandan presidency. Britain also tried to avoid a Ugandan recourse to the Security Council. 
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 All in all, the officials felt that their policy in the second phase of the Uganda-Tanzania 
War had been successful. Amin had fallen and was replaced by a moderate regime with an 
expressed interest in close relations with Britain. The policy had also allowed Britain to please 
Tanzania and maintain its influence there without losing influence with Kenya, its most 
important ally in Central East Africa. 
 
5.1 Britain and the Tanzanian invasion 
The war developments had serious impact on the extent to which Britain was willing to 
intervene in the Uganda-Tanzania War. Phase two started when Tanzania invaded Uganda on 
22 January 1979. Tanzania laid no claim to Ugandan territory and said it was simply putting an 
end to Ugandan border raids. But despite Tanzania’s statements that it had no ‘intention to take 
part in any process concerning the internal political changes in Uganda’253 it soon became clear 
that it was ‘liberating’ Southern Uganda from Amin’s rule, hoping that the Ugandan people 
would then join the exile forces and overthrow Amin themselves.254 
 Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda transformed it from victim to aggressor and challenged 
Britain’s established policy of support for it in the Uganda-Tanzania War. Tanzania was now 
in breach of the OAU principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention, and as Britain had 
condemned Uganda’s invasion three months earlier it might now be pressured into a public 
condemnation of Tanzania.255 Such a condemnation would be contrary to Britain’s interests; 
not only would it damage the Anglo-Tanzanian relationship and lose Britain the influence won 
with Tanzania in phase one, but increased international pressure could make Tanzania withdraw 
its army from Uganda before Amin could be overthrown. 
 Although Britain had no desire to condemn Tanzania, the invasion made continued 
active support for it difficult. The invasion of Uganda had cost Tanzania much international 
sympathy, and Britain would be castigated and accused of imperialist intervention in African 
affairs if caught supporting its invasion and attempted overthrow of the Ugandan government. 
The British officials therefore decided that ‘[i]n the wider context of our Africa policy it might 
be unwise to be seen to be too closely involved with a Government which might be accused of 
infringing the principle of territorial integrity endorsed by the OAU.’ 256 As the Kenyans 
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disapproved strongly of Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda, the officials believed that Britain 
through open support for it might ‘lose good-will with our best friend in Africa and expose 
ourselves to criticism in the OAU’257 and decided that ‘[i]n these new circumstances, we should 
think carefully before becoming too closely involved in Tanzanian tactics.’258 
 Thus, Britain could neither condemn Tanzania’s invasion nor support it openly. Its 
initial instinct was therefore to lay low and avoid association with the conflict while the invasion 
was ongoing. As secrecy was now even more paramount than in phase one, Britain’s public 
statements in phase two were few and designed to distance it from the conflict: 
 
While we condemned the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania, we have since largely avoided 
public comment, using the defensive line that African disputes should, where possible, be 
settled in an African context, and expressing the hope that a situation can be established 
where the two countries can live at peace.259 
 
The official policy, as expressed in these statements, remained the same as in phase one, with 
one adjustment: the omission of reference to OAU principles or condemnation of the aggressor. 
In this way, Britain was able to avoid offending Tanzania or expressing sympathy for Uganda. 
But nor did they come out in open support of Tanzania’s invasion. 
 Tanzania’s invasion had not changed Britain’s policy of support for it, but made secrecy 
paramount. Britain could not be caught supporting an aggressive Tanzania breaching OAU 
principles, and was therefore much less willing to intervene directly in the conflict in phase 
two. The officials sought to minimise Britain’s involvement in the conflict, and decided early 
on that ‘it would be unwise to pass unsolicited information to the Tanzanians, since this could 
place us in some awkwardness in the wider context of our Africa policy where we have laid 
stress to our support for the principle of respect for territorial integrity.’260 But the officials were 
also reluctant to provide Tanzania with information when asked for it, which they did on 26 
February. 261 They did not want to give the Tanzanians a rebuff, but ‘would not wish to pass 
back to the Tanzanians all that we have learned or deduced’. 262 Therefore, they opted only to 
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provide the Tanzanians with ‘information already publicly known or accepted in Dar es 
Salaam’,263 while being ‘careful to guard against any risk of appearing to collude with the 
Tanzanian Government in a situation which is clearly causing concern to some OAU 
members.’264 
The burgeoning Anglo-Tanzanian defence cooperation, which the officials had been so 
eager to foster prior to the Tanzanian invasion, was also delayed, as ‘[i]t could be embarrassing 
to become involved in detailed discussions with the Tanzanians about arms supplies at a time 
when Tanzanian forces are established well inside Ugandan territory.’265 But the officials did 
not find this difficult, as ‘[t]here would inevitably be delays in credits, payments and deliveries, 
reinforced by long lead times for delivery of some items. This would in fact be helpful – we do 
not want to move too fast.’266 As for the British weapons Tanzania obtained in phase one, Britain 
would just have to hope that Tanzania was not caught using any of them on Ugandan territory.267 
 But as the Uganda-Tanzania War changed in character from the last week of February 
1979, so did Britain’s attitude towards intervention in it. Britain was still reluctant to intervene, 
but by the end of March it was more directly involved in the conflict than it had been even 
during the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania. Three factors contributed to this change. 
 Firstly, as it became clear that its attempt to instigate an anti-Amin rebellion in Uganda 
had failed, Tanzania decided to march on Kampala and overthrow Amin itself.268 This made 
Amin’s fall a more likely and realistic objective than at any previous point in the Uganda-
Tanzania War. As the revival of British interests depended on Tanzania’s successful removal 
of Amin, Britain now became more invested in its military campaign. Tanzania would try to 
topple Amin with or without Britain’s assistance, and the officials deemed that helping it would 
have the added benefit of preparing the ground for British influence over a Ugandan successor 
government.269 
 Secondly, Libya intervened from late February 1979 in an attempt to save the Amin 
regime. The Tanzanian march on Kampala was at first highly effective, as the Ugandan army – 
undisciplined and short of supplies – disintegrated in front of it. But the arrival of between 1500 
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and 3000 Libyan soldiers and additional war supplies270 soon impeded Tanzania’s advance.271 
Thus, Libya’s intervention threatened to thwart Tanzania’s overthrow of Amin, which was 
Britain’s most important objective in this phase of the Uganda-Tanzania War. 
 Thirdly, Tanzania made a series of requests for British intervention in the conflict from 
late February 1979, eleven in the war’s last three weeks alone. The initial absence of Tanzanian 
requests had made it easy for Britain to keep its distance from the Tanzanian invasion, but the 
increasing Tanzanian demands now made this impossible. Britain must choose whether to 
comply with Tanzania’s requests of rebuff them; and as the officials deemed that ‘a direct rebuff 
would harm our relations with Tanzania’,272 it reluctantly acquiesced to Tanzania’s requests. 
 
5.2 British intervention during the Tanzanian invasion 
David Owen had asked that the Stansted flights be suspended in November 1978, but they were 
not banned until 5 March 1979. Uganda’s withdrawal from Tanzania the day after Owen’s 
request had lessened Britain’s incentive to suspend the flights. As Owen had never received a 
formal answer to his request, Cabinet Secretary John Hunt brought the issue to Callaghan in 
January 1979, stating that ‘we ought to be clear what we can do before the next crisis involving 
President Amin blows up’.273 Hunt recommended that the Defence and Overseas Policy 
Committee (DOP) be guided to accept the suspension of the flights, but that formal suspension 
should be held off until Amin was in trouble again as this was ‘more likely to make a public 
impact. It would also provide a response in a crisis when there might well be little else we could 
do. […] the balance of argument seems to point to waiting till the next crisis in our relations 
with Uganda.’274 The DOP agreed with Hunt’s logic, and on 22 January 1979 it decided that the 
Stansted flights should be suspended, but only at a later time.275 Owen moved to suspend the 
Stansted flights in late February 1979, as he deemed that ‘President  Amin is now in more 
serious trouble than at any time since he seized power. The Tanzanians seem determined to 
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keep up military pressure in the hope that Amin will crack.’276 The other Cabinet ministers 
agreed, and the flights were suspended. 
 The officials were careful to present the flight ban publicly as part of Britain’s existing 
policy of dissociation with Uganda,277 in order  
 
to safeguard against any tendency – which will doubtless be present – to interpret this 
decision as an attempt to put our own nail into Amin’s coffin. The Tanzanians may choose 
to interpret it that way; but we want to avoid the charge of interference in the internal affairs 
of an African country.278 
 
But Owen thought that ‘[t]he very cautious line taken towards Tanzania by the Organisation of 
African Unity suggests that such a charge would not be levelled at us.’279 
In fact, the suspension of the Stansted flights had minimal effect on the Amin regime. 
The cancellation of the flights was purely cosmetic, intended not to overthrow Amin regime 
but to remove its last connection with Britain. In reality, the Stansted flights had already ceased 
because of the Tanzanian invasion, and Uganda Airlines had signalled that they were unlikely 
to resume in the foreseeable future. The government decision therefore had very little practical 
effect on the stability of the Amin regime, and was mainly intended to impress Tanzania, world 
opinion and any Ugandan successor government by distancing itself from the Amin regime 
while ostensibly contributing to his fall: 
 
Our line should be that we have had no quarrel with the Ugandan people – indeed our 
relationship and friendships have been very close. The break in relations was a break with 
the Amin regime. We should rightly claim credit for that (and that is why we must stop 
Stansted before Amin falls).280 
 
This demonstrates that Amin’s overthrow was not Britain’s main objective with the flight 
cancellation, and explains why they were willing to suspend them only when his fall seemed 
certain. But the policy would work even if he should survive the Tanzanian invasion, as it might 
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weaken his power base over time and the FCO had finally succeeded in cancelling the 
embarrassing Stansted flights. 
Although it had suspended the Stansted flights and confirmed some information for 
Tanzania, Britain managed to avoid direct intervention in the Uganda-Tanzania War’s second 
phase until late March 1979. But Tanzania’s repeated requests for British intervention from 11 
March made it difficult for Britain to continue its disengagement from the conflict. President 
Nyerere had now become obsessed with the idea that Britain and the United States should 
convince Kenya to stop essential supplies from reaching Uganda, and made eleven requests for 
such intervention between 11 March and 4 April. Because of the bad relationship between 
Kenya and Tanzania, Nyerere would take no hints that he should approach Kenya himself. 
Instead, he wanted Kenya’s two most powerful patrons to convince it that the Ugandan army 
had disintegrated and only Libyans were fighting Tanzania – therefore, Kenya’s refusal to stop 
supplies did nothing to help Amin and simply prolonged the war. Nyerere also wanted Britain 
and the US to tell Kenya that Tanzania had no intention to foist Milton Obote on Uganda after 
Amin’s fall. 
 Tanzania’s requests were problematic for several reasons, and Britain was reluctant to 
acquiesce to them. Britain feared that intervention with Kenya would drag it directly into the 
conflict, at the risk of becoming an involuntary intermediary between Tanzania and Kenya. 
This would be directly contrary to Britain’s wish to stay out of the conflict. Pressuring Kenya 
to abandon its established policy of neutrality in the Uganda-Tanzania war would also annoy 
Kenya greatly, thus risking Britain’s good relationship with it. Nor would it necessarily be easy 
to convince Kenya that Tanzania did not wish to reinstate Obote, and ‘it would clearly be 
difficult to maintain our existing relationship with Kenya if we appeared to favour the 
emergence of a régime in Uganda which the Kenyans thought would be likely to be hostile to 
them.’281 Direct intervention with Kenya would also risk Britain’s relationship with other 
African countries as it ‘ran the danger of being accused of encouraging one African government 
at the behest of another to help overthrow a third.’282 It would be detrimental to British influence 
in Africa to be caught interfering in a conflict while the OAU was still attempting to mediate; 
this would expose the dishonesty of Britain’s professed hope for a peaceful, African solution 
and be disrespectful towards the OAU, and would open Britain up to accusations of imperialist 
intervention. Nor did Britain think that it could achieve anything by pressuring Kenya, as ‘[t]he 
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Kenyans are likely to remain extremely reluctant to cut off or further reduce fuel supplies to 
Uganda’.283 
 But intervention with Kenya could also be in Britain’s interests. The most important 
reason was that it didn’t want to offend Tanzania by refusing to help, thus losing the influence 
gained in phase one. The importance of this was emphasised when Nyerere was ‘obviously 
disappointed’ by the United States’ initial decision to refuse to intervene, 284 resulting in a US 
‘change of heart’ and they would ‘after all agree to speak to the Kenyans on the lines requested 
by President Nyerere.’285 Britain wanted to avoid arousing similar disappointment from 
Nyerere. (It was also helpful that Britain could cooperate with the United States in their 
approaches to Kenya, as this would increase pressure on Kenya and reduce the risks that Kenya 
could be annoyed with Britain alone. As Kenya’s main patrons, their cooperation could bring 
substantial pressure on it to change its policy.) Britain also saw Tanzania’s request as an 
opportunity to better Kenya-Tanzanian relations.  
 
We agree that direct contact between Nyerere and Moi is a prerequisite for lessening 
Kenyan distrust and that the Tanzanians must make clear their readiness to discuss their 
bilateral differences with Kenya [...] In terms of our interest in East African [sic] and our 
relationship with Nyerere, we think it desirable to make a further effort to bring this 
about.286 
 
If the relationship between the two countries could be improved, this would make it much easier 
for Britain to pursue its interests in Central East Africa, as it would not have to take their bad 
relationship into account and try not to disappoint one of them all the time. It would also help 
create a calmer and more politically stable region in which British regional interests could 
thrive. Britain also shared Tanzania’s interest in seeing Amin topple. Britain agreed with 
Tanzania that a stop in oil and war supplies would hasten his fall: 
 
It should be remembered here that Amin's oil is supplied through Kenya. Without it his 
economy and armed forces would grind to a halt in a matter of days. It is widely held that 
this could be the determining factor in any attempt to remove Amin by force. Additional 
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military capability in Tanzania and cooperation with Kenya could make this a viable 
option.287 
 
In fact, Britain had tried to deflect attention and pressure away from itself and the British oil 
companies in phase one by hinting that only Kenya could unilaterally stop Uganda’s oil 
supplies. But it had no desire to be the one to convince Kenya to do so. Britain also saw 
Tanzania’s need for Kenyan cooperation as an opportunity to cancel its support for Obote as 
President of Uganda. Britain considered the imposition of Obote as contrary to British interests, 
as they considered him ‘basically hostile’ to Britain.288 Britain had previously tried to convince 
Tanzania that promoting Obote would be damaging to relations with Kenya, but had accepted 
that ‘[t]here is precious little we can do […] to influence the composition of any successor 
government to Amin.’289 Tanzania’s requests for intervention with Kenya now provided an 
opportunity to eliminate Tanzanian support for Obote. 
 
We welcome this indication that President Nyerere recognises how deep are Kenyan 
suspicions over Tanzanian involvement in Uganda and understands the need not to be seen 
to be pressing a political solution and particularly not an Obote-dominated regime on 
Uganda.290 
 
 There was also the argument that the imposition of a neutral regime in Uganda would not 
disrupt the fragile balance of power in Central East Africa. 
 Clearly, Tanzania’s requests for British intervention with Kenya presented Britain with 
a difficult dilemma. Britain’s relationships with both Kenya and Tanzania were now at risk, as 
‘[t]he antipathy between Kenya and Tanzania makes it difficult for us to intervene in Nairobi 
without risking our relations with the Kenyans. But we cannot give a blunt ‘No’ to Nyerere.’291 
This conflict between Britain’s interests in Kenya and its interests in Tanzania delayed the 
decision-making process, as the British High Commissioners in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam 
disagreed strongly on how Britain should react to the requests. The Acting British High 
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Commissioner to Tanzania, Peter Hinchcliffe, 292 recognised that ‘there are objections to 
meeting the Tanzanian request’, but hoped that Britain could ‘at least avoid returning to the 
Tanzanians with a blank refusal to help’.293 But Britain’s High Commissioner to Kenya, Stanley 
Fingland, did not think that Britain could gain anything by pressuring Kenya on the issue: 
 
There is no inclination in Nairobi to help President Nyerere in this matter, since there is a 
deep suspicion throughout the Kenyan government of the Tanzanians' good faith and 
intentions, to the extent that some Kenyans would welcome the defeat of Tanzania in the 
current conflict.294 
 
In order to reconcile these conflicting interests and reach a decision on what Britain should do 
about the requests, the Prime Minister intervened himself, asking that Owen reach a decision 
and commenting that ‘[w]e should give Nyerere what help we can that will be effective’.295 
Therefore, Owen decided to try to steer a middle course so as to avoid hurting Britain’s 
relationship with either Kenya or Tanzania.296 Britain was to approach Kenya extremely 
carefully, presenting Tanzania’s views as British assessments of Tanzania’s attitude, and not as 
a Tanzanian message.297 As it did not believe that Kenya would abandon its position of 
neutrality, Britain’s aim was to convince Tanzania and Kenya to communicate directly about 
their bilateral conflict and the Uganda-Tanzania War, thus eliminating the need for further 
British facilitation. 
 It took time to solve this conflict of interests, and therefore Britain’s first approach to 
the Kenyans was made on 26 March 1979, a full two weeks after the initial Tanzanian request. 
High Commissioner Fingland told the Kenyans that Tanzania did not seem to be supporting 
Obote, and took the opportunity to ‘encourage them to take advantage of an apparent Tanzanian 
willingness to repair the relationship.’298 Fingland reported that the Kenyans ‘expressed keen 
interest in this indication of Tanzanian thinking, including the disclaimer that Nyerere was 
working for the promotion of an Obote dominated regime or seeking to impose a political 
solution on Uganda.’299 The Kenyans commented that this represented ‘a significant change 
                                                 
292 Peter R. M. Hinchcliffe was Acting British High Commissioner to Tanzania from 17 February 1979 to 17 
April 1979 while Britain’s High Commissioner to Tanzania, Peter J. S. Moon, was on leave. 
293 Peter R. M. Hinchcliffe to FCO, 11 March 1979, FCO 31/2682/108, TNA. 
294 Stanley Fingland to FCO, 13 March 1979, FCO 31/2682/110, TNA. 
295 Bryan Cartledge to J. Stephen Wall, 16 March 1979, FCO 31/2683/129, TNA. 
296 FCO to Stanley Fingland, 23 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/146, TNA. 
297 FCO to Stanley Fingland, 23 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/146, TNA. 
298 FCO to Stanley Fingland, 23 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/146, TNA. 
299 Stanley Fingland to FCO, 26 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/147, TNA. 
75 
 
from what had been their understanding of Tanzanian policies, which was very helpful to be 
aware of in connection with any future discussions between the two presidents.’ 300 Fingland 
considered the meeting a success, as the Kenyans were ‘clearly grateful to accept the 
information I had brought to Kenyan notice without feeling that we were in any way acting as 
intermediaries.’301 High Commissioner Hinchcliffe told the Tanzanians that Britain had 
discussed the situation with the Kenyans, who remained indisposed to take sides.302 The 
officials hoped that Kenya and Tanzania would now discuss the conflict directly with each other, 
leaving Britain out of it. 
 However, the Tanzanians had obtained information about Libyan war supplies and 
soldiers transiting Kenya for Uganda, and their requests for British intervention with Kenya 
continued. Therefore, Britain approached Kenya again on 31 March. Fingland was told to repeat 
that Tanzania did not back Obote and that the Uganda-Tanzania War ‘provides a valuable 
opening to establish direct communication with the Tanzanians on wider issues affecting Kenya 
and Tanzania and the future of the region.’303 He was also instructed to ‘sound them out in their 
attitude towards the use of Kenya by the Libyans as a transit point for supplies to Uganda. We 
would much rather the Kenyans desisted from such activity.’304 But before Fingland could bring 
this up, the Kenyans told him that their contact with Tanzania over the Uganda-Tanzania War 
seemed to be getting closer and that the Tanzanian Prime Minister was arriving for discussions 
with President Moi that morning. Fingland got ‘the clear impression that Kenyans were 
reviewing their attitude towards Libyan movements through Kenya’,305 and was told that Kenya 
had just decided that Libyan aircraft would be asked to leave Nairobi immediately, that no 
further flights carrying Libyan supplies to Uganda would be permitted to transit Kenya, and 
that an incoming shipload of Libyan war supplies for Uganda was to be turned away upon 
arrival.306 Fingland, who had not wanted to intervene with Kenya, considered it ‘very good 
news that Kenyans have come to these decisions of their own accord.’307 The officials believed 
they had navigated the breach between their Tanzanian and Kenyan interests well: 
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In some rather intricate, circumspect conversations with the Kenyans and Tanzanians we 
have managed, we think, to get the Tanzanians to recognise the importance of the Kenyan 
position and their dislike of Obote, while the Kenyans, for their part appear to be ready to 
move some way in doing what the Tanzanians want, to the extent of not allowing Libyan 
arms to transit Kenya.308 
 
But the high-level meeting between Tanzania and Uganda on 31 March went badly, and Kenya-
Tanzanian relations deteriorated once more. The Kenyans now appeared to be backtracking on 
their promises to stop transit of Libyan supplies; although they confirmed that Libyan troops 
would not be allowed to transit Kenya, they were evasive on whether they would allow arms to 
pass to Uganda and confirmed that Kenya would allow Uganda all the oil it could pay for.309 
Both Britain and the United States voiced concern at this apparent reversal of policy, stating 
‘that whilst Kenya’s holding to a strict policy of neutrality in the Tanzania-Uganda conflict was 
generally understood, there could be less public understanding and possible public criticism 
outside Kenya if she allowed special consignments of war supplies to go through on behalf of 
Libya, as opposed to simply continuing normal supplies for Uganda.’310 But British officials 
were unwilling to risk further intervention with Kenya despite renewed Tanzanian requests, as 
they believed ‘it would be damaging to appear to question Kenyan good faith when they appear 
to be adopting a tougher line on Amin and when we have at least achieved the objective of 
getting the Kenyans and Tanzanians into direct contact at a high level.’311  
Luckily for Britain, the Americans were willing to make one more attempt at changing 
Kenya’s policy and put an end to the continuing Tanzanian requests. President Jimmy Carter 
sent President Moi an oral message on 4 April which the Americans admitted ‘puts into Moi’s 
mouth words which go further than we in fact believe to be Kenyan policy on restricting 
supplies to Amin’,312 hoping that it would convince him to stop supplies to Uganda. The 
message congratulated Moi on ‘his decision to prohibit the airlift of petroleum to Uganda and 
the refuelling of Libyan aircraft to and from Uganda’, stating that the United States Government 
‘believes this step is consonant with Kenya’s position and that Kenya’s long-term interests are 
best served by its publicly stated policy that Kenya will permit no arms to transit Kenya for 
Uganda.’313 The American message appeared to have changed Moi’s mind, as he told the US 
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Ambassador that he could thank President Carter for the message and assure him that Kenya 
would not let Libyan supplies, fuel or arms transit Kenya for Uganda.314 President Nyerere was 
‘delighted’ with this Kenyan change of attitude and expressed his satisfaction with the British 
and American intervention.315 The officials were very pleased with their policy, as Tanzania 
seemed to think that Britain had put more pressure on Kenya than it had in fact done: 
 
In the end with the Libyan withdrawal the fuss died a natural death but not before the 
Kenyans had “been turned” (as the Tanzanian Foreign Minister put it) towards a more 
helpful frame of mind; a change of attitude for which the Tanzanians were prepared to give 
both ourselves and the Americans considerable credit but which was probably more due to 
a realistic re-assessment by the Kenyans of the likely outcome of the war in Uganda than 
to any change in their intense suspicions of Tanzanian and UNLF motives and intentions.316 
 
But the officials were disappointed that they had been unable to improve the bilateral 
relationship between Kenya and Tanzania, as they were ‘now apparently talking to one another 
but a deep gulf of suspicion remains and seems all too likely to do so for some considerable 
time to come.’317 
Britain also ignored Uganda’s appeals for a discussion of the Tanzanian invasion in the 
United Nations Security Council. Britain had been eager for Tanzania to demand a UN 
resolution against Uganda in phase one, but as Britain’s ally was now the aggressor and close 
to overthrowing Amin, discussion of the Uganda-Tanzania War in the UN was no longer in 
Britain’s interest. A discussion of the issue in the Security Council could also expose Britain’s 
support for Tanzania in the conflict. 
 Unfortunately, Uganda made four appeals to the Security Council about the conflict 
during the spring of 1979,318 and one was made by Libya.319 Luckily, none of the council 
members wanted to discuss the Uganda-Tanzania War; its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, was 
embarrassed by Amin’s invasion and would not ‘wish to annoy the Africans or the non-aligned 
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by taking a pro-Ugandan line’;320 China and the Western countries sympathised with Tanzania; 
and the Africa group was ‘most concerned at the prospect of Uganda insisting on a council 
meeting’321 as they were highly embarrassed by both Amin’s behaviour and their own inability 
to resolve the issue within the OAU. So, much to Britain’s advantage, there was ‘no enthusiasm’ 
for a meeting and ‘disposition to regard Amin’s phraseology as sufficiently ambiguous not to 
amount to a formal request for an immediate council meeting’.322 
 If an unambiguous request was made, Britain would have to support Uganda’s right to 
bring the matter before the Security Council – much to the dislike of the FCO officials323 – but 
‘would explain to the Tanzanians, African and other friends, that this was for reasons of 
principle and not because of any sympathy with Uganda.’324 At the meeting, the British 
delegation would aim to ‘say as little as possible and to avoid a statement if we can.’325 
Hopefully the other members of the Security Council would follow the same approach, and 
‘afterwards the matter would simply run out of steam and peter out. That would be by far the 
best outcome, if it has to come to a meeting at all. Frankly we are all waiting for Amin to fall 
and for it all […] to be over as soon as possible without having to declare ourselves’.326 
 On 28 March Amin made an unambiguous request for a meeting.327 But the African 
countries were ‘clearly embarrassed by the Ugandan request’328 and sent ‘a message to Amin 
indicating that they did not consider that it was wise to bring this matter before the Security 
Council at this stage while the OAU was still seized of it. […] The African Group did not want 
to wash their dirty linen in public’.329 In order to delay a meeting Britain and the United States 
suggested that ‘if no reply had been received from Uganda by an unspecified time next week 
the Council should look at the matter again.’ 330 Thus the timing of a potential meeting was left 
unclear, and the British officials were ‘satisfied that the principle has been upheld without our 
having to cross swords with the African Group and that a little time has been bought.’331 As the 
                                                 
320 Maeve Fort to Peter E. Rosling, 29 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/181, TNA. 
321 Ivor Seward Richard to FCO, 15 February 1979, FCO 31/2680/46, TNA. 
322 Ivor Seward Richard to FCO, 14 February 1979, FCO 31/2680/42, TNA. 
323 Peter E. Rosling to John A. Robson, 29 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/179, TNA. 
324 Peter E. Rosling to John A. Robson, 29 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/179, TNA. 
325 Maeve Fort to Peter E. Rosling, 29 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/181, TNA. 
326 Peter E. Rosling to Maeve Fort, 3 April 1979, FCO 31/2685/215, TNA. 
327 Idi Osman to Leslie O. Harriman, 28 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/164, TNA. 
328 Maeve Fort to Peter E. Rosling, 29 March 1979, FCO 31/2684/181, TNA. 
329 Maeve Fort to Peter E. Rosling, 30 March 1979, FCO 31/2685/188, TNA. 
330 Maeve Fort to Peter E. Rosling, 30 March 1979, FCO 31/2685/188, TNA. 
331 Maeve Fort to Peter E. Rosling, 30 March 1979, FCO 31/2685/188, TNA. 
79 
 
officials had hoped, Amin did not request the meeting and fell from power just over a week 
later. 
 Britain’s contingency planning for a United Nations Security Council discussion on the 
Uganda-Tanzania War clearly demonstrates that it only approved of a Security Council solution 
when it suited their own interests. The realities on the ground had direct impact on their 
willingness to bring the issue to the council, but also on their inclination to work for a real 
solution. Britain’s own policy interests were obviously a higher priority than the peacekeeping 
responsibilities of the Security Council. 
 
5.3 The results of Britain’s policy on the second phase of the Uganda-Tanzania War 
As Amin fled into exile on 11 April 1979, it seemed to Britain that much had been won by 
intervention in the Uganda-Tanzania War. The officials deemed that ‘Amin’s chances of 
playing any role in Uganda in future must surely have disappeared’, 332 and were pleased that 
he had been replaced by a politically moderate government with an expressed desire for close 
cooperation with Britain. After waiting for an appropriate number of African states to recognise 
the government of Yusuf Lule, Britain offered its recognition on 16 April.333 Early recognition 
of the new government and early offers of aid was intended to secure and maximise British 
influence with the new government. As the Soviet Union’s arming of Amin harmed its 
prospects of future influence in Uganda and it seemed that Britain would become a main patron 
of Uganda, British officials were very pleased with what they had achieved there. 
 The officials were also satisfied that they had been able to preserve – or maybe even 
increase – the influence won with Tanzania in the first phase of the war. They judged that ‘these 
events have on the whole brought benefit to British Tanzanian relations’,334 and were very 
pleased that this had been accomplished ‘at comparatively little cost.’335 The officials were 
particularly pleased that they had been able to turn around Nyerere’s initial dissatisfaction with 
their assistance: 
 
On 29 November 1978 Nyerere expressed dissatisfaction with our role in regard to the 
Ugandan situation when speaking to Mr. Cledwyn Hughes. He was then doubtless 
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disappointed at our inability to be more forthcoming in our response to Tanzanian requests 
for assistance – (particularly arms) and was also probably influenced by stories of British 
assistance to Amin (e.g. the Stansted flights). Yet, by the time, not five months later, 
Tanzanian troops captured Kampala we had been elevated to the front rank of Tanzania’s 
friends (in the Ugandan context) and the President was obviously warmly appreciative of 
our attitude and our actions.336 
 
The officials believed that this turnaround was caused by the extension of aid and additional 
credit in December 1979, as well as to Britain’s positive response to the Tanzanian request for 
a closer military relationship, its continued expediting of Tanzanian orders, its ‘understanding’ 
of Tanzania’s position and apparent willingness to put across Tanzania’s views to the Kenyans 
(although avoiding a formal mediatory role) which certainly led the former to believe that we 
played an important part in changing the Kenyan attitude to the passage of war supplies to 
Uganda through Kenya’. 337 The decision to stop the Stansted flights when Amin was vulnerable 
was also believed to have pleased the Tanzanians. 338 
 The officials were also relieved that Britain’s relationship with Kenya had not been 
compromised, and were very pleased with its policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War: 
 
From our point of view the outcome of the Tanzania/Uganda war has so far been largely 
gain. We are glad to see Africa disembarrassed of Amin. The assistance and support we 
have given to Tanzania have been to the benefit of British Tanzanian relations […] We 
now also have the prospect of renewing fruitful relations with Uganda. What may require 
careful handling in the future is the balance of our relations between the three East African 
countries – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.339 
 
But, as the officials were well aware, only time could reveal the amount of influence really won 
through their policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War.340 
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Chapter 6  
A profound lack of confidence as a major power? 
 
Although the predominant impression is that Labour was necessarily preoccupied with 
domestic issues during this period, the avowal of Britain’s diminished power and status 
provided them with the opportunity for the first time to impose a fresh vision of Britain’s 
interaction with the outside world which was rooted in the principles of socialist 
internationalism tempered by pragmatic recognition of the realities of world affairs.341 
 
So far this thesis has been devoted to the examination and analysis of Britain’s policy on the 
Uganda-Tanzania War. It is now time for a brief discussion of whether or not this policy fits 
the research literature’s frequent portrayal of the late 1970s as ‘the moment when British decline 
reached its nadir, marked by further retreat from existing commitments under the pressure of 
intractable domestic political and economic difficulties’ and its suggestion that ‘Britain’s 
defining characteristic in this period was a profound lack of confidence as a major power, 
dependent on its nuclear deterrent for residual status and influence.342 
 Scholars on the Callaghan government seem to have been so mesmerised by the 
domestic crisis facing it that they have almost completely neglected its foreign policy, thus 
inadvertently creating the impression that it didn’t have one or at least that it is not an interesting 
topic for research. And yet it is perhaps the Callaghan years that provide the most interesting 
opportunity to study Britain’s foreign policy under pressure, both from domestic crisis and from 
its perceived loss of international status. If Britain’s defining characteristic in the late 1970s 
really was ‘a profound lack of confidence as a major power’ due to domestic difficulties, one 
would expect this to be particularly conspicuous during the winter of 1978-9. But as this 
examination of Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War has demonstrated, this is not a 
fitting description for Britain even at its ‘nadir’ in 1978-9. 
 When the Uganda-Tanzania War suddenly broke out in October 1978, Britain 
immediately seized it as an opportunity to increase its global power by strengthening British 
influence in Southern and Central East Africa. By supporting Tanzania in a war that could 
potentially lead to Amin’s overthrow, Britain hoped to gain influence in Uganda and Tanzania, 
ideally replacing what the officials considered predominant communist influence in Central 
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East Africa. The officials also hoped to use any influence gained with President Nyerere to 
bring about a mediated settlement to the Rhodesia crisis, thus ridding Britain of an embarrassing 
and constant reminder of its imperialist legacy and an impediment to British influence in the 
developing world. Intervention in the Uganda-Tanzania War could therefore not only preserve 
British influence in Africa against increasing communist influence, but open new possibilities 
for Britain to exert its global power. 
Britain pursued a policy of active intervention in the Uganda-Tanzania War. Although 
it took great care to present itself publicly as a passive bystander hoping for the conflict’s 
peaceful resolution by African actors, Britain covertly undermined just such a solution through 
material, economic and diplomatic support in an attempt to secure Tanzania’s military defeat 
of Uganda. Britain’s policy of support for Tanzania remained constant even as Tanzania 
transformed from victim to aggressor, committing the same offenses for which Britain had 
recently condemned Uganda. Although the Tanzanian invasion made the secrecy of Britain’s 
policy even more paramount, it continued to provide Tanzania with diplomatic support 
throughout its campaign. 
Britain’s policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War was developed in the lower echelons of 
the FCO. David Owen did little to shape the policy, and was mostly content to approve the East 
African Department’s policy suggestions. The research literature’s portrayal of Owen as a 
‘weak’ Foreign Secretary fits well with his unobtrusive role in the development of policy on 
this conflict. Concurrently, the literature’s portrayal of Callaghan as a Prime Minister with 
strong influence on foreign policy is also correct as far as his involvement with Britain’s policy 
on the Uganda-Tanzania War is concerned – although he did not micromanage its development, 
he redirected and shaped the policy when he considered it necessary. 
Britain’s willingness to intervene actively in this unanticipated conflict demonstrates its 
readiness to seize unexpected opportunities to further its foreign policy objectives even in the 
face of severe domestic crisis. As the Uganda-Tanzania War was a relatively small and 
unimportant local conflict that posed no threat to Britain itself, it could choose whether to 
intervene or not. Clearly, a Britain politically paralysed by domestic crisis would not necessarily 
have had the capacity to act on this opportunity – but as this thesis has demonstrated, it did. It 
immediately placed the Uganda-Tanzania War in a global context, perceiving it as an 
opportunity to further British interests and influence globally, and in acting on it displayed both 
great power thinking and an impressive opportunism during times of crisis. 
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One could argue that the financial constraints restricting Britain’s policy on the Uganda-
Tanzania War were a clear sign that the domestic crisis was limiting its ability to pursue foreign 
policy. While this is probably to some extent true, it does not automatically follow that Britain 
would have spent more money on this conflict if it had the opportunity. The limited political 
will to prioritise the conflict represented a limitation in itself, and one that would not necessarily 
have been alleviated even if Britain had not been in domestic turmoil. 
Another restriction that Britain faced was the restrictions its status as a great power and 
former colonialist put on its relationship with Africa and developing countries. Britain would 
not pursue a policy that these countries would view as imperialistic, as such accusations were 
incredibly harmful to Britain’s international image and influence. This demonstrates that 
Britain was still perceived internationally as a great power and acted as one in its pursuit of 
interests in distant parts of the globe. Although the fear of imperialist accusations restricted the 
policy that Britain could pursue on the Uganda-Tanzania War, I also believe it to be one of the 
reasons for its choice to intervene; Britain could not actively and openly pursue its interests in 
Central East Africa, but the special circumstance of the Uganda-Tanzania War allowed it to do 
so and get African gratitude in return. 
 Although Britain’s reaction to this one small African conflict cannot necessarily be 
assumed to be representative for Britain’s foreign policy as a whole, it is still indicative of 
Britain’s willingness to pursue an active and global foreign policy even at its ‘nadir’ in 1978-9. 
It also seems reasonable to believe that parallel with the interest it took in this particular conflict, 
the FCO must have been pursuing policy on many other conflicts, developments and events 
around the world. It is therefore my conclusion that Britain’s opportunism and active 
intervention in the small, local war between Uganda and Tanzania in 1978-9 does not 
correspond with the portrayal of British foreign policy in the late 1970s as defined by ‘a 
profound lack of confidence as a major power’. Rather, it points towards a government in 
opportunistic pursuit of British interests in remote parts of the globe, despite the domestic crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
Bibliography 
 
Archival primary sources 
 
Conclusions of Meetings of the Cabinet (CAB) 
CAB 148 Cabinet Office: Defence and Oversea Policy Committees and Sub-Committees: 
 Minutes and Papers 
 
CAB 148/178 Defence and Oversea Policy Committee: meetings 1-4, papers 1-16 
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
FCO 31 Commonwealth Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa  
 Departments: Registered Files. 
FCO 96 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Energy Department: Registered Files 
 
FCO 31/2268 Political relations between Ethiopia and UK 
FCO 31/2369 Internal political situation in Tanzania 
FCO 31/2375 Military assistance to Tanzania 
FCO 31/2376 Military assistance to Tanzania 
FCO 31/2377 Military assistance to Tanzania 
FCO 31/2389 Internal political situation in Uganda 
FCO 31/2390 Internal political situation in Uganda 
FCO 31/2392 Political relations between Uganda and USA 
FCO 31/2397 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2398 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2399 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2400 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2405 Oil supplies to Uganda 
FCO 31/2406 Oil supplies to Uganda 
FCO 31/2407 Oil supplies to Uganda 
FCO 31/2638 Political relations between Tanzania and other African countries 
86 
 
FCO 31/2643 Military assistance to Tanzania from the UK 
FCO 31/2644 Military assistance to Tanzania from the UK 
FCO 31/2647 Export licence applications for arms and military equipment to Tanzania 
FCO 31/2671 Opposition to President Idi Amin of Uganda 
FCO 31/2675 Internal situation in Uganda 
FCO 31/2680 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania: Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2681 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania: Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2682 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania: Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2683 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania: Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2684 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania: Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 31/2685 Relations between Uganda and Tanzania: Uganda-Tanzania War 
FCO 96/789 Energy matters in Uganda: oil and Uganda’s invasion of Tanzania 
 
Prime Minister’s Papers (PREM) 
PREM 16 Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1974-1979 
 
PREM 16/2268 Tanzania. Relations with Uganda; Ugandan incursion and Tanzanian counter-
 attack; request for UK military assistance 
PREM 16/2285 Uganda. UK/Uganda diplomatic relations; internal situation after Air France 
 hijacking and Israeli rescue operation; fate of Dora Bloch; Amin’s overthrow after 
 Tanzanian intervention; Yusufu Lule’s accession as head of state; Uganda Airlines 
 flights into Stansted (‘whisky run’) 
 
Books and articles 
 
Acheson-Brown, Daniel G., «The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda: A Just War?», in:  
 International Third World Studies and Review, Voume XII,  2001. 
Aluko, Olajide, «African Response to External Intervention in Africa since Angola», in: 
 African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 391, 1981. 
Avirgan, Tony, and Martha Honey, War in Uganda. The Legacy of Idi Amin, Dar es Salaam: 
 Tanzania Publ. House, 1983. 
Ballinger, Chris, and Anthony Seldon, «Prime Ministers and Cabinet», in: Anthony Seldon 
 and Kevin Hickson, New Labour, Old Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan  
 Governments, 1974-79, London: Routledge, 2004. 
87 
 
Baylis, John, and Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics. An 
 introduction to international relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Borrows, Noreen, «Tanzania's Intervention in Uganda: Some Legal Aspects», in: The World 
 Today, 1979. 
Branch, Daniel, Kenya. Between hope and despair, 1963-2011, New Haven: Yale University 
 Press, 2011. 
Childs, David, Britain since 1945: A political history, 6th ed., London: Routledge , 2006. 
Clapman, Christopher, Africa and the international system. The politics of state survival, 
 Cambridge: Taylor & Francis, 1996. 
Conroy, Harry, James Callaghan, Lodon: Haus Publishing Limited, 2006. 
Cooley, John K., The Libyan Sandstorm, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983. 
Cooper, Frederick, Colonialism in Question. Theory, knowledge, history, Berkeley: 
 University of California Press, 2005. 
Curtis, Mark,  The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy since 1945, London: Zed 
 Books, 1995. 
Curtis, Mark,  Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World, London: Vintage 2003. 
Darwin, John, Britain and decolonisation. The retreat from empire in the post-war world, 
 Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988.  
Deveney, Paul J., Callaghan's Journey to Downing Street, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
 2010. 
Falola, Toyin, Key Events in African History. A Reference Guide, Westport,Conn:Greenwood 
 Press, 2002. 
Fielding, Steven, «The 1974-9 Governments and ‘New’ Labour», in: Anthony Seldon and 
 Kevin Hickson, New Labour, Old Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 
 1974-79, London: Routledge, 2004. 
Furley, Oliver, «Britain and Uganda from Amin to Museveni», in: Kumar Rupesinghe,  
 Conflict Resolution in Uganda, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1989. 
Gordon, David F., «Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania», in: The Annals of the 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science, January, 1987 
Griffiths, Ieuan, «The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries», in: The  
 Geographical Journal, Vol. 152, No. 2, The Royal Geographical Society, 1986. 
Harbeson, John W, and Donald Rothchild, Africa in World Politics. The African state system 
 in flux,  Boulder: Westview Press, 2000. 
Harrison, Brian, Finding a role? The United Kingdom 1970-1990, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
 2010. 
88 
 
Hennessy, Peter, The Prime Minister: The office and it’s holders since 1945, London: Allen 
 Lane, 2000. 
Hickson, Kevin, and Anthony Seldon, New Labour, Old Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan 
 governments, 1974-79. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Hill, Christopher, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
 2003. 
Holmes, Martin, The Labour Government, 1974-79. Political Aims and Economic Reality, 
 London: Macmillan, 1985. 
Hornsby, Charles, Kenya: A History Since Independence, New York: I.B.Tauris, 2012 
Ingham, Kenneth, Obote, A political biography,  London: Routledge, 1994. 
Kennedy, Paul,  The Realities Behind Diplomacy. Background Influences of British External 
 Policy, 1865-1980, London: Fontana, 1981. 
Khadiagala, Gilbert M., «Uganda’s Domestic and Regional Security since the 1970s», in: The 
 Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol31. No.2, Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Kum, Joseph M., «A Perceptual Approach», in:  Journal of Peace Research, Vol 27, No. 4, 
 Sage Publications, Ltd, 1990. 
Kyemba, Henry, State of Blood. The Inside story of Idi Amin, Paddington Press Ltd, 1977. 
Lane, Ann, «Foreign and Defense Policy», in: Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson, New 
 Labour, Old Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79, London: 
 Routledge, 2004. 
Lapping, Brian, End of Empire, London: Granada Publishing, 1985. 
Low, D.A., Eclipse of Empire, Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Lowe, Norman, Mastering modern British history, 4th ed., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
 2009. 
Lloyd, T.O., Empire, Welfare State, Europe : History of the United Kingdom 1906-2001, 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Lloyd, T.O., The British Empire 1885-1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Mutibwa, Phares, Uganda since Independence: A story of unfulfilled hopes, London: Hurst, 
 1992. 
Mayall, James, «Britain and Anglophone Africa», in: Amadu Sesay, Africa and Europe. From 
 partition to independence or dependence?, London: Croom Helm, 1986. 
McIntyre, David.W, British Decolonization, 1946-1977, When, Why and How did the British 
 Empire Fall?, New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1998. 
Morgan, Kenneth O., Callaghan. A Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
89 
 
Morgan, Kenneth O., «Was Britain dying?», in: Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson, New 
 Labour, Old Labour. The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79, London: 
 Routledge, 2004. 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Understanding International Conflicts. An introduction to theory and 
 history. Seventh edition, New York: Pearson Longman, 2009. 
Okoth, Godfrey P, «The OAU and the Uganda-Tanzania way, 1978-79», in: Journal of 
 African Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, 1987. 
Osman, Abdulahi A., Governance and Internal Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the 
 relationship, London: Adonis & Abbey Publisers Ltd, 2007. 
Owen, David, Time to Declare. Second Innings,  London: Politicio, 2009. 
Pargeter, Alison, Lybia. The rise and fall of Qaddafi, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
 2012. 
Pryce, Sue, Presidentializing the Premiership,Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. 
Reynolds, David, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th century, 
 London: Longman, 2000. 
Roberts, George, «The Uganda-Tanzania Way, the fall of Idi Amin, and the failure of the 
 African diplomacy, 1978-79», in: Journal of Eastern African Studies, Volume 8, Issue 
 4, Routledge, 2014. 
Robbins, Keith, The Eclipse of a Great Power: Modern Britain 1870-1992, London:  
 Longman, 1994. 
Sandbrook, Dominic, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979, London: Allen 
 Lane, 2012. 
Sanders, David, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role. British Foreign policy since 1945,  
 Houndmills : Macmillan ,1990. 
Schmidt, Elizabeth, Foreign intervention in Africa. From the Cold War to the War on Terror,  
 New York,:Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Seftel, Adam, and Annie Smyth, The story of Julius Nyerere Africa’s Elder Statesman, Der es 
 Salaam: Fountain Publishers Ltd, 1998. 
Sesay, Amadu, Africa and Europe. From partition to independence or dependence?, London: 
 Croom Helm, 1986. 
Shillington, Kevin, Encyclopedia of African History, Volume 3 P-Z, London, 2005. 
Tamarkin, M, The Making of Zimbabwe. Decolonization in regional and international politics,  
 London: Frank Cass, 1990. 
Taylor, Ian, and Paul Williams, Africa in International Politics. External involvement on the 
 continent, London: Routledge, 2004. 
Wheeler, Nicholas J., Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
90 
 
Ofcansky, Thomas P., and Rodger Yeager, Historical dictionary of Tanzania. Second Edition, 
 London: The Scarecrow Press Inc, 1997. 
Young, Crawford, «The Heritage of Colonialism», in: John W. Harbeson and Donald 
 Rotchild, Africa in World Politics. The African state system in flux, Boulder, Colo.: 
 Westview Press, 2000. 
 
 
Online sources 
The Hansard, 8 December: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1978/ 
dec/08/tanzania 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary, Imperialism: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
 english/imperialism 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary, Power:http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/
 power 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary, Salient: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
 english/salient 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary, Theory: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
 english/theory 
 
